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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1998 Supreme Court Term was relatively unremarkable'
until a final day blitz in which the Court announced the Alden
Trilogy, named for Alden v. Maine,2 the lead case in a trio of
federalism cases. Decided by identical 5-4 votes, these cases
immunize state governments from citizen damage suits
alleging a violation of federal rights. Alden v. Maine shields
states from such private damage actions brought in state court.
3
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank (College Savings Bank 1), provides states immunity
from patent infringement suits brought in federal court.4
Similarly, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board (College Savings Bank II) insulates states
from private damage actions brought in federal court alleging
unfair competition under the federal trademark law
This "Tuesday Trilogy"6 declared portions of three federal
statutes unconstitutional,' overturned one thirty-five-year-old
decision of the Court,8 reversed the outcome in another,9 and
1. The Court closed on the earliest end-of-term date in thirty years. See Linda
Greenhouse, High Court Used Term to Favor States'Rights, COM. APPEAL, Memphis,
June 28, 1999, at A2. It adjudicated 75 signed decisions, half the number typically
decided in the 1980s. See Susanna Sherry, Some Targets Were Larger Than Others,
WASH. POsT, July 4,1999, at B4. The Court avoided deciding any of the hot-button
issues that comprise the so-called "culture war" of the late Twentieth Century-
race, religion, gay rights, abortion, right to die, etc. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 42-43 (1991) (describing
recent societal disputes as a "culture war").
2. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
3. Id. (dismissing private damage action brought by state employees in state
court alleging violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994) [hereinafter FLSA]).
4. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) [hereinafter College Say. Bank ].
5. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) [hereinafter College Say. Bank 11].
6. The phrase originally was coined by Susanna Sherry. See Sherry, supra note 1
(taking advantage of an alliteration made possible by the coincidence that the
three cases were all decided on Tuesday, June 23,1999).
7. College Say. Bank I, 119 S. Ct. 2199, overturned two sections of the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a)
(1994). College Sav. Bank I, 119 S. Ct. 2219, struck down portions of the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA), Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567
(1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994) and amendments to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125,1127 (1994)). Alden, 119 S. Ct. 2240, struck down § 216 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216 (1994) (creating federal jurisdiction to hear damage actions against the state
in state court).
8. See College Say. Bank 1, 119 S. Ct. at 2222 (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry.,
377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
9. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2257-58 (1999) (reversing the outcome in Hilton v.
South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991)); see also discussion infra
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precipitated a forty-five-minute "scene of extraordinary
drama""0 at the Court the morning the cases were announced
from the bench. Each Justice who wrote a majority opinion read
excerpts from it, as did the authors of the various dissenting
opinions. Several Justices digressed from text during their oral
presentations." As one account put it, the exchange was "[n]ot
exactly a street brawl episode of 'The Jerry Springer Show,' but
this was about as dose to high drama as it gets in the
distinguished, white-columned building that most Americans
equate with the essence of justice." 2 Another report observed
that "[t]he rhetorical volleys ... held the audience of tourists
and government lawyers spellbound." 3  The opinions'
strident 4 and sometimes sarcastic' language revealed a deep
notes 84-88.
10. Linda Greenhouse, Court's Votes Favor States; Justices Deliver Blow Against
Federalism, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 24,1999, at 2, available in 1999 WL 7027061.
11. For example, from the bench, Justice Stevens characterized the majority's
vision of sovereign immunity as a "mindless dragon that indiscriminately chews
gaping holes in federal statutes," an approach that returns the country to that
"brief period of confusion and crisis when our new nation was governed by the
Articles of Confederation." Id. Justice Souter added that the Court has created "a
very peculiar state of affairs" for those wanting to enforce their legal rights against
a state government. Richard Carelli, Divided Court Boosts States' Power: Justices
Split 5-4; Blow Seen for Rights of Individuals, Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 1999, at
A3.
12. Warren Richey, How Court Keeps Its Squeaky Clean Image, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 30, 1999, at 2. The intensity of disagreement in the Alden Trilogy
decisions contrasts sharply with the Court's normal posture as a "beacon of
dignity and civility." Id. (citing BARBARA PERRY, THE PRIESTLY TRIBE: THE
SUPREME COURT'S IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND (1999)).
13. Greenhouse, supra note 10. As another observer put it, "[t]he three cases
were a bit convoluted, but announcing them together created a sense of drama
and momentousness." Editorial, Putting the Brakes on Federal Controls, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., June 29,1999, at B6.
14. One reader read in them a "bitterly divided Supreme Court." The Supreme
Court: Activism in Different Robes, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 22. For example,
Justice Souter wrote what has been characterized as a "blistering 58-page dissent"
in Alden, Richey, supra note 12, in response to a "passionately voiced" 51-page
majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, Civil Move on States' Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 6, 1999, at 8. Justice Souter concluded that "[it would be hard to
imagine anything more inimical to the republican conception which rests on the
understanding ofits citizens precisely that the government is not above them, but
of them, its actions being governed by law just like their own." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at
2289 (Souter, J., dissenting).
In a wonderful historical twist, Justice Souter, addressing a group of high school
civics teachers two days before the announcement of the Alden Trilogy, urged them
to remind their students that although the members of the Court may at times
disagree, they all genuinely respect one another. See Richey, supra note 12. One
wonders if Justice Souter were engaging in preemptive damage control.
15. See College Say. Bank I, 119 S. Ct. at 2232 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("Justice
Breyer reiterates (but only in outline form, thankfully) the now-fashionable
revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth in other opinions in a
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division within the Court as the two sides attempted to
describe their irreconcilable understanding of the founding
generation's intent regarding state sovereign immunity.
The general media appraisal of the Alden Trilogy has
emphasized two themes: the interpretive process used by the
Court and the, political power redistribution the Trilogy
achieved. Opponents, primarily, cite process. They lament the
absence of textual support in the majority's opinion1 6 or
criticize the majority's historical understanding. 7 Regarding
the Trilogy's redistribution of political power between the
federal and state governments, the Trilogy has received strong
praise from those who delight in the states' new-found
degree of repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods."); id. (arguing
that the dissenters have adopted an approach to stare decisis that is "perverse
and "backwards-unless, of course, one wishes to use it as a weapon rather than a
guide, in which case any old approach will do"); Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2289 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority is "[aipparently beguiled by Gilded
Era language describing private suits against States as 'neither becoming nor
convenient" (citing the majority opinion, id. at 2263 (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443,505 (1887))).
16. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Perspective on Justice: High Court Wrongly Lets
States Off Hook, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1999, at B7 ("There is no provision [in the
Constitution] that limits the ability to sue a state in state court or that prevents a
state from being sued in federal court by its own citizens. The high court simply
invented a new right for state governments."); ECONOMIST, supra note 14, at 22
("'In the absence of even a textual hint in the constitution, the court discerned
from the constitutional "ether" that states are immune from individual lawsuits."'
(quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional
Law at Harvard Law School)); Anthony Lewis, Editorial, Overreaching Justices
Reshape American Government, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 2, 1999, at A15,
available in 1999 WL 6951723 ("[The] majority changed the structure of American
government [and] did so without a word of support in the text of the
Constitution."); cf Gary Rosen, Triangulating the Constitution, 108 COMMENTARY,
July 1, 1999, at 59, 64 ( [Cjontroversies over the Constitution since the New Deal
have hinged far less on the document's words than on the fierce contest between
rival schools of interpretation.").
17. See, e.g., ECONOMIsT, supra note 14, at 23 (describing the majority's historical
argument as "'strained, even silly"' because "[t]he concept of states' sovereignty
'.. was almost useless for Americans from 1776. They decided that sovereignty
lay with the American people, not with any particular government entity'"
(quoting Jack Rakove, Historian at Stanford University and author of Original
Meanings)); Id. at 23 (characterizing the Court's opinion in Alden as "a long
excursion into historical reconstruction"); Editorial, Court Ruling Wrongly Strips
Citizen Remedy, NEWS TRI. (Tacoma), June 27,1999, at B6.
The majority relied on . . . sovereign immunity [doctrine] taken from the
American Colonial past. It has its roots in England and prevented vassals
from suing their lords. The doctrine-an obsolete, pro-royalty relic- has been
carried over to mean that citizens can't sue states, no matter how egregious or
negligent state's conduct may be, even if Congress grants citizens the power
to sue.
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freedom from federal control that these cases seem to provide.1 8
Others object to what they perceive as an untoward judicial
activism manifested in these cases, 9  particularly what
opponents conclude is an arrogant disregard for Congress and
the majority rule foundations of our constitutional system.2'
In this Article, I discuss the Trilogy's interpretive process and
its redistribution of political power, but do not linger on either.
This Article is written in praise of the Alden Trilogy, but praise
coupled with protest. I make three essential points. First, the
Trilogy deserves praise as a pragmatic masterpiece. Through it,
18. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Federalism Is More Than States' Rights, WALL ST. J.,
July 1,1999, at A22.
A social-issues federalism would permit state and local experimentation with
variegated arrangements. This would diffuse national, all-or-nothing conflicts
and, at the margin, allow citizens to sort themselves into the jurisdictions most
to their liking. Such a real, competitive federalism presupposes firm, judicially
enforceable limits on Congress. Only when Congress is barred from imposing
one-size-fits-all solutions will the states have to compete for their citizens'
business, talents, assets, and affections.
Id.; Martin Morris Wooster, Let 50 Flowers Bloom, AM. ENTER., July 1, 1999, at 85
(reviewing MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT
COULD HAPPEN (1999))
[S]ix decades after federalism fell victim to the nationalist ambitions of the
New Deal, it may yet be possible to establish decentralized competitive
political institutions.' ... [R]eturning power to the states might defuse some of
today's most potent culture wars by offering both sides the opportunity to
achieve their goals in some places.... Freed from Washington's red tape, the
states can be flexible, creative, and innovative, which means they can do a
better job of many governmental functions than Washington can. 'An
integrated national economy ... needs a muscular federal government about
as much as an increasingly complex global economy needs a United Nations
with teeth.'
Id. (quoting MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT
COULD HAPPEN 150 (1999))).
19. The majority has been characterized as a "determined band of conservative
justices" possessing a "zeal to tilt the balance of political power away from
Washington towards the states [who have] embarked on a venture as detached
from any constitutional moorings as was the liberal Warren Court of the 1960s in
its most activist mood." ECONOMIST, supra note 14, at 2; see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 16 ("[T]he decisions are the height of conservative judicial activism
...."); David G. Savage, Conservatives Rule Supreme: Justices Moving Ahead via the
Past, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 28, 1999, at 1A, available in 1999 WL
20267598 ("'This is the first time in more than 60 years where we see an aggressive
conservative activism. . . .They have shown themselves willing to overturn
decisions made by the democratic process, and they are prepared to do it without
any basis in the text of the Constitution."' (quoting Louis M. Seidman, Professor of
Law at Georgetown University)).
20. See Richey, supra note 12 ("'I think this [Clourt is masquerading as a [C]ourt
that is doing what the people want, but it is not a democratic court. It is
overruling the people in many respects . . . [and is] at least as radical as the
Warren Court."' (quoting Stephen Gottlieb, Professor of Law at Albany Law
School)).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
the Court shrewdly avoided a constitutional quagmire that
easily could have created a federalism crisis.
Second, I argue that the Alden Trilogy is an exemplar of
misdirection. Here I render reluctant praise, like that given to
an opposing baseball team's dramatic double-play. Though one
dislikes the outcome, one cannot deny the skill just witnessed.
In this regard, I show that through its deft deployment of state
sovereign immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has enhanced
its own power as well as that of the federal Executive Branch-
to the detriment of Congress's lawmaking power. Moreover,
although the Trilogy focuses on Congress's remedial authority,
it thwarts Congress's substantive lawmaking capacity.
Third, I show that the Trilogy has a dark side. Today, no
individual can bring a damage action in any court against an
unconsenting state to enforce federal statutory rights enacted
pursuant to Congress's Article I powers.2" This situation creates
a profoundly disquieting enforcement gap that threatens to
undermine the rule of law values in our constitutional scheme,
particularly the principle that for every right there ought to be
a remedy.
To situate this Article's praise and protest of the Alden Trilogy
doctrinally, I begin with an abridged summary of the
federalism developments of the past several decades,
developments that preordained the confrontation that resulted
in the Trilogy. Next, I describe the holdings of each Trilogy case,
including the interpretive frameworks adopted, and identify
unresolved issues generated by these holdings. I then turn to
my principal undertaking: consideration of 1) how the Trilogy
pragmatically avoided a constitutional crisis; 2) how the three
cases masterfully invite attention in one direction while
moving the law in another; and 3) how these cases raise rule of
law concerns by creating a disjunction between Congress's
substantive and remedial authority.
I. THE NEWFEDERALISM-A CREATURE OF THE 1990s
Even though the story has been reported widely, it is worth
pausing to review the major developments that led to the
21. The Court treats statutes validly enacted wholly or in part pursuant to
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See discussion
infra notes 63,139-55 and accompanying text.
328 [Vol. 23
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decisions in the Alden Trilogy. In 1971, in Younger v. Harris, " the
Burger Court reinvigorated the states' rights values in the
Constitution when it denied a request to enjoin a pending state
court criminal proceeding, notwithstanding the federal
plaintiffs', allegation that the underlying state criminal statute
was facially unconstitutional. Justice Black,, writing for the
majority in Younger, rejected the unarticulated assumption of
these requests for injunctive relief: that state courts will not be
as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights
promptly and effectively. That assumption, he argued, is
disrespectful of the states and disruptive of "Our Federalism,"
described as the conviction that "the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways."23
By 1976, the Court's composition had changed sufficiently to
apply this new federalism in a most dramatic way. Overruling
precedent,24 the Court decided National League of Cities v.
Usery,25 holding that Congress lacked authority to impose the
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)26 on state
and local governments. As Justice Powell later explained this
development, "federal overreaching under the Commerce
Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of
power between the states and the federal government, a
balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties."27 The
National League of Cities doctrine developed into a complex
weighing of the respective interests of the states and the federal
govermment.2 The Court balanced the cost of exempting states
22. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
23. Id. at 44.
24. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
25. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
27. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
28. At its most developed stage, the National League of Cities doctrine
immunized the states from commerce power-based legislation when four
conditions were satisfied. First, the federal statute at issue must regulate "the
'States as States.'" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452
U.S. 264, 287 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854). Second, the
statute must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state
sovereignty."' Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845)
(alteration in original). Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must
"directly impair [the states'] ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions."' Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities,
426 U.S. at 852). Finally, the relation of state and federal interests must not be such
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from the reach of federal law29 against the injury done to the
states if forced to comply with federal enactments." A key
consideration became whether "the States' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."'31
-In San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Garcia,32
decided in 1985, the Court again changed course, reversing
National League of Cities. A 5-4 majority concluded that National
League of Cities and its progeny were unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice. The majority reasoned that the
"safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system"
adequately protect states' interests.33 Writing for the dissent in
Garcia, Justice Powell rejected the proposition that federal
political officials, invoking the commerce power, could be
trusted to be the arbiters of the structural limitations on their
authority.' 4 Justice Kennedy subsequently sounded that same
that "the nature of the federal interest ... justifies state submission." Id. at 288 n.29
(1981) (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53).
29. A central inquiry with respect to the federal interest was whether exempting
states from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal program.
See Hodel, 452 US. at 282 (holding national surface mining standards are
necessary to insure competition among states). Also considered was how closely
the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause,
viz., the promotion of a national economy and free trade among the states. See
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic
element of interstate commerce than electric energy.... ."); Transportation Union
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Congress long ago concluded
that federal regulation of railroad labor services is necessary to prevent
disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy.").
30. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-51.
31. Transportation Union, 455 U.S. at 684 (1982) (quoting National League of Cities,
426 U.S. at 852).
32. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
33. Id. at 552; see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) ("States
must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national
political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state
activity."); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (arguing that "the composition of the Federal
Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by
Congress," and that this goal was furthered by vesting the states "with indirect
influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by their control of
electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections" and "more direct
influence in the Senate, where each State received equal representation and each
Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his State.").
34. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668, 671 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (warning against
undue reliance on the structural protections inherent in the federal system, noting
that deference to Congress's work is warranted when "legislative facts" are built
on "empirical foundations" and are the product of a legislative process
[Vol. 23
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battle cry, most notably in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Lopez.3" The national political process, he argued,
inherently is unreliable as a source of protection of the states'
sovereignty interest.36 In a short dissent in Garcia, Justice
Rehnquist protested that the majority had rejected a salutary
principle "that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court."
3 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist's prediction has begun to come to
fruition. Garcia has not been reversed explicitly, but the years
subsequent to Garcia have witnessed increased reliance on a
federalist interpretive framework in the Court's decisions.
Richard Fallon's exquisite treatment of the subject explains that
under the regime of this framework, "states emerge as
sovereign entities against which federal courts should exercise
only limited powers, and state courts, which are presumed as
fair and competent as federal courts, stand as the ultimate
guarantors of constitutional rights."38 This effort to reorient
constitutional law has manifested itself widely39 but no more
punctuated by serious and earnest reflection and consideration of the evidence,
but is not warranted when congressional conclusions amount to unsupported
"ipse dixit").
35. 514 U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Lopez, the Court
found constitutional limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power to protect the
regulatory prerogatives of state and local governments, noting inter alia that
Congress had failed to make any findings that the regulated activity (the presence
of handguns near schools) has an adverse effect on interstate commerce. See id. at
562-63 & n.4.
36. See id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Noting that federalism presents
the Court with the most difficult cases of constitutional structure, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that, although the political branches have a "swom obligation" to
uphold the "constitutional design," the "absence of structural mechanisms to
require those officials to undertake this principled task, and the momentary
political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a
complete renunciation of the judicial role." Id. at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (noting "[t]he hydraulic pressure
inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power. .. ."); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the
Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 500 n.22 (1997)
(speculating that recent federalism cases "may be informed by a mistrust of the
institutional capacity for self-restraint of the political branches (and of the lower
federal courts)").
37. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1143-44 (1988). Fallon points out, however, that post-1970s federal courts
law also is marked by decisions that rely on what he calls a "Nationalist" set of
preconceptions and preferences. See id. at 1148. He argues that this Federalist-
Nationalist duality is not new but "exhibits itself most powerfully in the modem
era in... the seminal Federalist case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and
the ... Nationalist decision in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)." Id. at 1168-69.
39. See id. at 1172-87 (discussing the penetration of the federalist interpretive
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profoundly than in the law of state judicial immunity.
Literally read, the Eleventh Amendment" strips federal
courts of Article III diversity jurisdiction when a state is a
defendant.41 It does not speak to federal question jurisdiction.
For at least one hundred years, however, the Court has held
that states' protections against federal jurisdiction is much
broader than the mere text of the Eleventh Amendment. Since
Hans v. Louisiana,42 the Court has "reaffirmed that federal
jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States 'was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the
judicial review power of the United States."'43 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from hearing, among
other things, cases against a state brought by one of its own
citizens asserting a federal right.'
framework in the law regulating res judicata and collateral estoppel as well as
habeas corpus); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997) (holding that
Congress may not "commandeer" local officials to help administer federal statutes
regulating handguns); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)
(holding the take-title provision of a federal regulatory program amounted to a
congressional attempt to "'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States"'
because it forced the state to either pass legislation or take title to nuclear waste
(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981))). The Court has contained this partial return to National League of Cities by
repeated assurances that Congress retains authority to regulate the states as part
of a program that affects states and private parties alike. See New York, 505 U.S. at
160.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.").
41. The Eleventh Amendment reversed Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793), which held that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to hear a
diversity action brought against a state based on a state law cause of action. See id.
at 425-27. The Amendment's literal scope also could eliminate federal judicial
power to hear federal question suits brought by a diverse plaintiff. See discussion
infra note 48.
42. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
43. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at
15).
44. See P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
144 (1993) ("'[A]n unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal
courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state."' (quoting
Edelman v. Jordan, 515 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974))). Other applications sever the
Eleventh Amendment from its text by interpreting it to protect states from suit in
federal court. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 501 U.S. 775 (1991)
(when sued by an Indian Tribe); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (in
admiralty suits); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (suits brought by
foreign states).
Conversely, the Eleventh Amendment is construed not to bar certain suits. See
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (suits against states brought by other
states); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (suits brought by the
[Vol. 23332
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A minority on the Court mounted a determined, but
ultimately unsuccessful, campaign during a short period in the
mid-1980s to return the Eleventh Amendment more closely to
its textual groundings.45 This effort coincided with an extensive
body of legal scholarship concluding that Hans had been
decided incorrectly.46  The arguments opposing Hans
metamorphosed several times, eventua ly emerging as three
approaches:47 the literal,' the diversity,4 and the abrogation
United States); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (same); Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410 (1979) (private actions brought in state court of another state on a
state law cause of action).
The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to damage actions in federal courts
against state officers sued in their individual capacities. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974); see also discussion infra notes 306-97 and accompanying text.
In addition, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits seeking injunctions
against state officers in federal court. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) see
also discussion infra notes 273-305 and accompanying text.
45. See discussion infra note 50 and accompanying text.
46. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683,1693-1703,1722-25 (1997) (discussing the literature advancing competing
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendent); cf id. at 1722-23 (arguing that "[t]he
doctrinal payoff for [diversity theorists'] historical scholarship has been small,"
and that their claims have been limited to demonstrating that the EleventhAmendment "was not intended to withdraw 'arising under' jurisdiction over suitsagainst the states" but was "indeterminate" with respect to whether "the Framersof Article Ill intended to extend the federal judicial power to suits against the
states based on federal law in the first place").
47. See James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of
the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269,1273,1274 n.16 (1998).
48. As its name suggests, the literal model accepts that Congress may not create
federal diversity jurisdiction for suits against states nor provide for "arising
under" jurisdiction against a state in suits brought by a diverse party. See id. at1273 n.15 (citing proponents); see also Vzquez, supra note 46, at 1698 (explaining
that under this view, the Amendment wouid apply to suits 'arising under
federal law, but only if the suit was brought by a citizen of a different state or of a
foreign state"). Accordingly, [u]nder the literalist account, only in-state plaintiffs
may invoke federal question jurisdiction in suits against the state." Pfander, supra
note 47, at 1273 n.15. At one point, this view was championed by Justice Brennan,
who subsequently abandoned it. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfarev. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 US. 279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan abandoned this in favor of the abrogation view of theEleventh Amendment. See discussion infra note 50.
49. Unlike the literal model, the diversity model acknowledges that states have
a constitutional sovereign immunity from ali diversity jurisdiction suits broughtin federal court but not otherwise. See V uez, supra note 46, at 1696-97 & n.62
(citing authority). Thus, Congress creates no constitutional breach in providingfor
federal question jurisdiction for suits brought against a state, even if broughtby a
diverse plaintiff. See Pfander supra note 47, at 1273 n.15; see also John C. Jeffries Jr.,
In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983,84 VA. L. REV. 47,48 n.9 (1998)
(citing the leading diversity theorists and concluding that thtey represent the
"dominant academic position"); id. at 48 n.10-11 (citing "rebuttals andcontributions from other perspectives").
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Opposition to Hans never gained majority support at the
Court.5' However, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.5 a majority
held that Congress possesses authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court through exercise
of the Commerce Power. 3 To the extent this abrogation power
is extended to other Article I powers, states would be subject to
private damage suit in federal court on federal claims virtually
whenever Congress so determined. This would effectively end
the Hans era.' In 1996, the Court overruled Union Gas in
50. See Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1696-98. The abrogation model has two
branches that need to be differentiated and clarified. The first, and less solicitous
to states' sovereign immunity rights, argues that the Eleventh Amendment merely
confirms that Article III does not abrogate state sovereign immunity but the
Amendment does not bar Congress from abrogating it. Extended to its broadest
application, this view would seem to permit Congress to provide for diversity
jurisdiction in federal court notwithstanding the language of the Eleventh
Amendment. On this view, the state sovereign immunity that survived the
ratification of the Constitution is a common law immunity. See Vizquez, supra
note 46, at 1696 & n.58 (citing proponents of this view). The second branch, a close
variant but more protective of states' interests, holds that Congress may not create
federal diversity jurisdiction for suits against states but otherwise states enjoy a
common law sovereign immunity that acts as a constitutional default, an
immunity Congress may abrogate. See id. at 1697-98. By the mid-1980s, four
members of the Court had adopted this variant of the abrogation model. See
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 261-63, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Professor Vdzquez argues that "it seems awkward to call it an
'immunity' at all if Congress has the power to withdraw it. Such an 'immunity'
would operate merely as a presumption that generally applicable [federal] laws
have not been made applicable to the states." Vtzquez, supra note 46, at 1697-98.
51. In Welch v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987), the Court was
evenly split. Justice Scalia concurred without agreeing or disagreeing with the
Brennan view. See id. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Subsequently, Justice Scalia rejected this view and voted to uphold
Hans in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
52. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
53. In the Eleventh Amendment cases of the mid-1980s discussed above, the
Brennan bloc acquired a fifth vote from Justice White who agreed that the
Commerce Clause so empowered Congress, but Justice White was unwilling to
join Justice Brennan's lead opinion in Union Gas, making that a plurality opinion.
See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
54. See id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If Hans means only that federal-question
suits for money damages against the States cannot be brought in federal court
unless Congress clearly says so, it means nothing at all."). For an argument that
the combination of Union Gas and the clear statement rule of Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
represents a "subconstitutional judicial compromise" that preserves Congress's
abrogation authority but makes immunity the default and requires Congress to
consider the federalism implications directly, see Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive
Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the Assumption of State Court
Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1287,1307-08 (1994).
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Seminole Tribe v. Florida.s In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that
state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court is a
constitutional, not common law, immunity, which is beyond
the reach of Congress's abrogation authority through exercise
of its Article I powers.5 6
Seminole Tribe thus created a gap between Congress's
substantive and remedial authority.' The search to preserve
state accountability to federal law in the face of the remedial
limits Seminole Tribe imposes soon concentrated on seven
alternatives: (1) consent;5 8  (2) suit against units of local
government; 9 (3) suit by the federal government;60 (4)
prospective relief;6' (5) damage actions against state officers;
62
55. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Seminole Tribe not only affirmed Hans but extended it. In
Hans, 134 U.S. 1, the plaintiff invoked general federal question jurisdiction to raise
a constitutional challenge to the repudiation of certain state bonds. Congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, the issue in Seminole Tribe, was not at
issue in Hans.
56. 517 U.S. at 72-73. The litigation in Seminole Tribe arose out of a dispute under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994), 18 U.S.C. §§
1166-1168 (1994), enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Power, but its
holding applies to all of Congress's legislative powers. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 72-73.
57. Garcia had held that the Tenth Amendment imposes no substantive
limitation on Congress's regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate states as states. See discussion supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
But see the discussion about subsequent limits placed on Congress's substantive
authority, supra note 39. The Court's Eleventh Amendment cases, especially
Seminole Tribe, deny Congress the authority to provide for private damage
remedies against the states in federal court to enforce the very rights and duties
Garcia entrusts Congress to create.
58. Sovereign immunity bars suit in federal court only in the absence of
consent. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (holding that a state may
consent to jurisdiction, and thereby waive immunity, by "express language" or by
"overwhelming implication]"). The federal government may encourage consent
by conditioning the grant of a federal gratuity on states consenting to suit, but this
option has limits. See discussion infra note 237.
59. The Eleventh Amendment applies to the states but not to its local political
subdivisions. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123
n.34 (1984) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not apply to 'counties and similar
municipal corporations."' (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977))); discussion infra notes 238-52 and accompanying
text.
60. Sovereign immunity does not bar suits in federal court by the United States
to enforce federal rights against the states. See United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128,136-38 (1965) (holding state sovereign immunity does not apply to suits
against the states in federal court brought by the federal government or its
agencies); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-46 (1892) (same); discussion
infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
61. Sovereign immunity does not bar private party action in federal court
against state officers in their official capacity to obtain prospective relief from
continuing violations of a federal statute. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664; Chavez v.
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(6) enforcement of Section 5-based legislation;63 (7) suit in state
court;
64
The Alden Trilogy addressed the last two alternatives: suits
against a state in state court to enforce federal rights and
abrogation of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court through Congress's exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Alden Trilogy is important
because it eliminated the first and substantially restricted the
second.6'
III. THE ALDEN TRILOGY: THE HOLDINGS, INTERPRETIVE
FRAMEWORKS, AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
A. Alden v. Maine: A State's Sovereign Immunity in Its Own Courts
Until quite recently, federal courts scholars did not
concentrate on the question of Congress's power to require
state courts to hear federal claims against state governments.
66
Before Seminole Tribe in 1996, it seemed Congress could
abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court through
exercise of its Article I powers, so there seemed no pressing
need to consider state courts as alternative forums. 7 Secondly,
Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that, even if copyright
claim cannot be brought against a state in federal court because Congress lacks
Section 5 authority to enact the copyright laws, "[tihe Exparte Young doctrine [209
U.S. 123 (1908)] permits suits for prospective injunctive relief."); Armstrong v.
Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1263-64 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting prospective relief
against state official sued in official capacity for violating the ADA); discussion
infra notes 273-305 and accompanying text.
62. Sovereign immunity does not bar private party damage actions in federal
court against state officers sued in their individual capacities. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); discussion infra notes 306-97and accompanying text.
63. Congress retains authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suit
in federal court pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the provisions of that amendment. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976). However, there are restraints on Congress's use
of this authority. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("[T]here must be a
congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved."); discussion
infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
64. An open question remained after Seminole Tribe whether state sovereign
immunity bars private damage suits against a state in its own courts to enforce
federal rights. See discussion infra notes 65-138 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 223-397 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
remaining alternatives.
66. See Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1695 n.56 (demonstrating that revisionist
scholars devoted little attention to whether state sovereign immunity is immunity
from suit in federal court only or immunity from damage liability in state and
federal court).
67 See discussion supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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there seemed to be little reason to explore the availability of
state courts to enforce federal rights because federal courts
seemed preferable.6 8 Accordingly, few scholars paid heed to the
tantalizing dicta in several Supreme Court decisions, pre-
dating Alden, suggesting that a state could not be sued in its
own courts to enforce federal rights without its consent.69
In 1997, Professor Carlos Manuel Vizquez published an
important article that brought the question to the forefront of
academic inquiry.7 ° He carefully traced the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence and concluded that the Supreme
Court seemed poised to interpret state sovereign immunity as
immunity from nonconsensual suit on federal causes of action
not only in federal court, but also in a state's own court.71
Vdzquez's argument relied, in part, on dicta in Seminole Tribe72
68. From the Constitution's earliest days, the constitutional parity of state and
federal courts has been a delicate topic. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 347 (1816), expressed concern over regional bias when it decided that in
diversity cases "the constitution has presumed.., that state attachments, state
prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests might sometimes obstruct, or
control, or be supposed to obstruct, or control, the regular administration of
justice." Today, judicial independence dominates the debate, with the federal
judiciary having the obvious structural advantage because of the Article III
guarantees of tenure and security from salary reduction. See U.S. CONST. art III,
§ 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."). The literature is heavily weighted towards finding federal courts
institutionally superior as adjudicators of federal law. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Vicki C. Jackson,
Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 116
(1998); Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977); cf.
James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal
Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 197 &
n.148 (noting that federal courts may be preferred over state courts to adjudicate
federal questions because the Supreme Court is the only federal court competent
to review error in state courts and the Supreme Court "cannot secure the effective
enforcement of federal law in all cases first litigated in the state court"). But see
Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 605, 635-37 (1981); Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical
Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233 (1999) (finding parity using
empirical analysis in state and lower federal courts' interpretations of Supreme
Court precedent in Takings Clause cases).
69. See discussion infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
70. See Vzquez, supra note 46.
71. See id. at 1702-20; see also Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of
Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 153-54 (1997) (suggesting
Congress lacks constitutional authority to compel states to adjudicate federal
claims against the state in state court).
72. See Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1717 ("In summing up its holding overruling
Union Gas, the Court in Seminole Tribe stated that '[e]ven when the Constitution
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and in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.Z3 His view ran
contrary to conventional wisdom,74 and the conclusions in his
article were disputed.7
It is understandable that one might entertain serious
reservations about accepting that state judicial immunity
entails immunity from liability in private damage actions on
federal claims in either federal or state court.76 First, the
language of the Eleventh Amendment refers only to federal
judicial authority and the Court often has made plain that the
Eleventh Amendment only applies to federal courts.77
Moreover, lower federal courts had assumed that even when
federal courts are not available to hear certain federal claims
against a state, plaintiff may seek redress in state court.78 In
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting states." (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 71 (1996)) (alteration in Vdzquez)); id. at 1702-03 ("The [Seminole Tribe] majority
stated that the Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over suits
arising in the state courts 'where a State has consented to suit."' (quoting Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14)); id. at 1717-20 (discussing the indications in Seminole
Tribe of "a shift towards a conception of the Eleventh Amendment as an immunity
from liability.").
73. 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (noting that the effect of shielding states from suit in
federal court is to "leav[e the] parties with claims against a State... if the State
permits, in the State's own tribunals"); see also Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1702 n.93
and accompanying text.
74. See Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1688 n.28, 1689 n.34 (citing literature taking
both positions).
75. See Jackson, supra note 36, at 544 n.176.
While I agree [with Vizquez] that some language in Seminole Tribe and other
opinions suggest that states may have some sovereign immunity in their own
courts, and that these in turn could be read as consistent with an 'immunity
from liability' understanding, I disagree that the Court does... understand
the Eleventh Amendment in these terms.
Id. at 503-05 & nn.39-41 (same).
76. Discussing a state court's duty to hear federal claims against a state
somewhat puts the cart before the horse, for the initial question always is whether
a state court may hear a particular federal claim. In most cases, concurrent federal
and state court jurisdiction over federal claims is the constitutional default. See
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (affirming the
"deeply-rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction" to
hear federal questions). The presumption of concurrent federal and state court
jurisdiction to hear federal questions can be rebutted only "by an explicit statutory
directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests." Id.; accord
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (concurrent jurisdiction of state courts to hear
civil RICO claims); Yellow Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (same with
regard to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
77. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1991)
(citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)).
78. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
that, even if copyright suits against the states cannot be brought in federal court
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addition, many state courts agreed that they must hear federal
claims against state government,79 although others disagreed."
Finally, one might be forgiven for insisting that immunizing
states from private damage claims in any court when federal
law provides for such a damage remedy poses the troubling
rule of law concern that Congress is being permitted to create
federal rights that are illusory.
81
Supreme Court precedent did not provide reliable guidance
regarding whether state sovereign immunity included
immunity from suit in its own courts on federal claims. The
precise issue had never been litigated in the Court, but two
cases seemed apposite: Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways
because Congress lacks Section 5 power to enact the copyright laws and noting in
dicta that the Eleventh Amendment only shields states from being sued in federal
court); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 817 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that an FLSA
action for damages against the state may not be brought in federal court, but
suggesting in dicta that "the employee can sue in state court for money damages
under the FLSA as a state court of general jurisdiction is obligated by the
Supremacy Clause to enforce federal law"); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203,
211 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Sltate employees may sue in state court for money damages
under the FLSA, and a state court would be obligated by the Supremacy Clause to
enforce federal law."); see also Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 441 (5th Cir.
1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding that a finding that Congress lacks Section
5 authority to enact the ADA would not "eviscerate the basic protections the ADA
gives disabled individuals against discriminatory state action [because] the
plaintiff could still sue a state in state court to enforce the obligations the state
owes the disabled under the ADA").
79. See, e.g., Ahem v. New York, 244 A.D.2d 7, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("In
Seminole Tribe v. Florida..., the United States Supreme Court merely held that the
11th Amendment prevents a private party from suing a State in Federal court, not
that Federal statutes do not apply equally to both non-State and State defendants"
because the sovereign immunity principle animating the Eleventh Amendment is
not "'immunity from suit in any forum." (quoting Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695,
610 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). Other states have taken the same position. See Whittington
v. State, 966 P.2d 188 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct 2388 (1999); Bunch v.
Robinson, 712 A.2d 585 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1998); Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of
Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999); Ribitzki v. School
Bd. of Highlands County. 710 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Clover Bottom
Hosp. & Sch. v. Townsend, 513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974).
80. See, e.g., Allen v. Fauver, 742 A.2d 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999);
Keller v. Dailey, 706 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio Ct App. 1997); Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172,
174 (Me. 1998), aWd, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (dismissing claim under the overtime
provisions of the FLSA); Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 298 (Me. 1988), cert. denied
491 U.S. 904 (1989) (dismissing claim under the federal Rehabilitation Act); Board
of Comm'rs. v. Splendour Shipping & Enters., 255 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1972);
see also Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Mass.
1991) ("Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the question whether
States may claim immunity in their own courts when the Eleventh Amendment
bars suit in Federal Court, we think that, absent congressional command to the
contrary, they may.") (emphasis added).
81. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1489
(1987).
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Commission8 2 and Howlett v. Rose. 3 A close review shows that
neither is controlling or particularly compelling.
In Hilton, the Court reversed a state court's refusal to provide
a forum to adjudicate a damage claim brought against a state-
operated railway pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA).s' The Supreme Court had previously held that
federal courts were not required to provide a forum for FELA
actions, because Congress had not adequately manifested an
intent to provide a federal court forum for FELA actions.8s The
South Carolina supreme court extended this precedent to state
courts. The Supreme Court in Hilton concluded that the
question before it was "a pure question of statutory
construction." 6 The Court held Congress did intend such
causes of action, notwithstanding the asymmetrical result such
a conclusion creates.87 Hilton did not address a state's
constitutional duty to provide a forum.
88
82. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
83. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
84. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
85. See Welsh v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
86. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 205.
87. See id. at 206. In large part, stare decisis dictated the conclusion in Hilton. In
Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court found that Congress had
intended to provide FELA rights for employees of state-owned railways. As a
consequence, many states drafted workers' compensation laws on that
understanding of the FELA. See id. at 202-03. The Court acknowledged that to
reinterpret the FELA would "avoid[ the federalism-related concerns that arise
when the National Government uses the state courts as the exclusive forum to
permit recovery under a congressional statute." Id. at 206. But, to change the
interpretation of the FELA now "would strip all FELA . . . protection from
workers employed by the States," id. at 203, and thwart "just expectations," id. at
206.
88. In Hilton, the Court stated that "when ... a federal statute does impose
liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in
every State, fully enforceable in state court." Id. at 207. Whether "enforceable" was
intended to mean "may be enforced" or "must be enforced" was left for another
day. Perhaps more importantly, Hilton did not entail requiring a state to defend in
state court a suit that the Eleventh Amendment barred from being brought in
federal court. The reason is that when Hilton was decided, just two years after
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), Congress was thought to possess
power through the Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
federal court. See discussion supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, when Hilton was decided, the FELA could not be enforced against
the states in federal court because Congress had failed adequately to manifest an
intent to so provide, not because Congress lacked abrogation authority.
Recent cases have reversed the outcome in Hilton. Today, due to the holding in
Seminole Tribe, Congress may not grant a federal court jurisdiction to hear a
private FELA damage action against a state. Nor may Congress provide for such a
suit against an unconsenting state in state court, due to the holding in Alden.
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Howlett speaks to a general constitutional duty of state courts
to adjudicate federal claims 89 but, like Hilton, is wide of the
mark. In Howlett, the plaintiff brought a § 198390 action in state
court against a school board. The state court dismissed the
action. The state court explained that § 1983 suits brought in
federal court can be maintained only against "persons," and
that a government entity that has sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court is not a "person" within the meaning of §
1983. The court acknowledged that determination of whether a
government entity has sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court is a question of federal law. However, the state court
held that when § 1983 suits are brought in state court, the
relevant inquiry is whether the state has waived its sovereign
immunity to suit under § 1983 as a matter of state common law.
Because the state court held that Florida had not so waived its
sovereign immunity, the court determined that it had no need
to reach the issue of whether school boards are "persons"
under § 1983.91
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens stated that the issue was "whether a state law defense
of 'sovereign immunity' is available to a school board otherwise
subject to suit in a Florida court even though such a defense would
not be available if the action had been brought in a federal forum."
92
The majority opinion explained that because municipalities,
counties, and school districts do not enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity when sued in federal court, they are
"persons" subject to suit under § 1983.93 Thus the Howlett suit
could have been brought in federal court. Therefore, "[t]o the
extent that the Florida law of sovereign immunity reflects a
substantive disagreement with the extent to which
governmental entities [subject to suit in federal court] should
be held liable for their constitutional violations [in state court],
that disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal
law."
94
89. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,366-67 (1990).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
91. See Howlett v. Rose, 537 So. 2d 706,708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
92. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 376 ("[M]unicipal corporations and similar governmental entities
are 'persons' . ... "); see also Monell v. New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
663 (1978).
94. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378 ("'Congress surely did not intend to assign to state
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The Court also rejected Florida's alternative argument that
Congress cannot require state courts to hear cases that the state
law of sovereign immunity excludes from their jurisdiction.
Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law the law in
each of the states, and because state courts are bound by the
Constitution and laws of the United States made to conform to
the Constitution, state courts have a responsibility to enforce
federal law "in the absence of a valid excuse."'5 Discrimination
against federal law is not a valid excuse.96 The key is whether
state courts enforce the "same types of claims" arising under
state law 7 because it also is clear that state courts may enforce
"a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the
courts.""' The Court found that Florida courts may not refuse
to hear § 1983 claims against a school board because Florida
courts are courts of general jurisdiction with authority to hear
private damage claims and enter judgment against school
boards under a wide variety of state causes of action, including
matters of the type presented in § 1983 litigation.99
Howlett thus addressed a state's duty to open its courts to
federal claims that also could be brought in federal court. The
case was silent regarding the state's duty to open its courts to
claims that constitutionally may not be brought in federal
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and
characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action."' (quoting
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,269 (1985))).
95. Id. at 369; accord Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Claflin v. Houseman, 93
U.S. 130,136-37 (1876).
96. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 371-81; see also McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co.,
292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934) ("[Ihe federal Constitution prohibits state courts of
general jurisdiction from refusing [to hear a case] solely because the suit is
brought under a federal law."). As the Court explained in McKnett, the refusal to
hear the FELA action constituted discrimination "against rights arising under
federal laws" in violation of the Supremacy Clause because the state court had
"general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which [the action] here brought
belongs." Id. at 232-34; accord Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.
Co., 223 U.S. 1, 58 (1912) (holding that a state may not discriminate against federal
law when state courts have jurisdiction "appropriate for the occasion').
97. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 394 (1947).
98. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372 (1990). As the Court in Howlett explained,
The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law
as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that
the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is
presented. The general rule "bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of
state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them."
Id. (quoting Henry Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
99. See id. at 378-81.
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court. That was the issue litigated inAlden v. Maine.
In Alden, a group of state probation officers filed an FLSA
overtime claim against the State in state court after a federal
court had dismissed the identical claim following the Supreme
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe.'0 The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the state trial court's dismissal of the
action."' The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that "the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the
United States Constitution do not include the power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state
court."' 0 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argued that
the concept of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is
"something of a misnomer" because "sovereign immunity of
the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment."0 3 It derives instead from the history
and structure of the Constitution.
With respect to history, the majority concluded that the
Constitution's intent, as confirmed by the Tenth Amendment,
is that the states are to play a vital governing role through their
status as sovereign entities ' 4 and are to be accorded the
"dignity and essential attributes inhering in [sovereign]
status."'05 Justice Kennedy then argued that prior to the
100. After Seminole Tribe, the lower federal courts uniformly rejected federal
jurisdiction to hear FLSA minimum wage and overtime claims against the state.
See Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 712 n.5 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[AIlI of the
circuits to have addressed the issue following Seminole Tribe have held that the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA do not validly abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity."). But see id. at 717 ("Congress validly
abrogated the [states'] Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the Equal
Pay Act."); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding same);
Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
same).
101. See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172,174 (Me. 1998), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
[Slovereign immunity... protect[s] the State from suit by private parties in its
own courts without its consent, even when the cause of action derives from
federal law ... [because] [i]f Congress cannot force the states to defend in
federal court against claims by private individuals, it similarly cannot force
the states to defend in their own courts against the same claims.
Id.
102. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2246 (1999).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 2247 (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,71 n.15 (1996)).
105. Id. (concluding that states are to be sheltered from "'the concept of a
central government that would act upon and through [them]' in favor of 'a system
in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority
over the people'" (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997))).
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Constitution's ratification, immunity from suit was considered
a fundamental aspect of sovereignty,'16 and the Constitution
was intended to preserve such state sovereign immunity from
suit. This immunity, the majority concluded, is evidenced from
the ratification debates, 07 the reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia,"8
the Eleventh Amendment's ratification debates, 109 and the
Court's own precedent.110
The majority opinion took refuge in the Framers' silence on
the issue of constitutionalizing a state's immunity from suit in
its own court, concluding that:
[s]ilence is best explained by the simple fact that no one, not
even the Constitution's most ardent opponents, suggested
the document might strip the States of the immunity [from
suit in their own courts]. . . . [Silence] suggests the
sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit in its own
courts was a principle so well established that no one
conceived it would be altered by the new Constitution.
11
106. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247 ("[Tlhe generation that designed and adopted
our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign
dignity."). The opinion relied for this proposition on English common law, as
understood from previous Supreme Court decisions and commentators such as
Blackstone. See id. at 2248.
107. See id. at 2248 ("The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the
people in no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of
sovereign immunity." (citing Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall)). In addition, the
records of the state ratifying conventions were read as demonstrating that "the
Constitution [was] drafted to preserve the States' immunity from private suits."
Id. at 2249 (citing ratification debates in Rhode Island and New York).
108. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Court cited a call by the Massachusetts
legislature to its representatives in Congress to remove from the Constitution any
basis for "'a decision, that, a State is compellable to answer in any suit by an
individual or individuals in any Court of the United Sates."' Alden, 119 S. Ct. at
2250 (quoting DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801, at 196 (1997)).
109. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2251-52 ("The text and history of the Eleventh
Amendment ... suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the
original constitutional design .... The more natural inference is that the
Constitution was understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the
States' traditional immunity from private suits [both in federal and state court].").
110. See id. at 2253-54.
111. Id. at 2260. The Court added,
To read [the history of the ratification of the Constitution and its Eleventh
Amendment] as permitting the inference that the Constitution stripped the
States of immunity in their own courts and allowed Congress to subject them
to suit there would turn on its head the concern of the founding generation-
that Article II might be used to circumvent state-court immunity. In light of
the historical record it is difficult to conceive that the Constitution would have
been adopted it if had been understood to strip the States of immunity from
suit in their own courts and cede to the federal government a power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits in these fora.
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In addition, the Court found neither the Supremacy Clause" 2
nor the Necessary and Proper Clause" 3 an impediment to its
conclusions. The Court dismissed the former as circular,114 and
considered the latter trumped by the implicit principles of
sovereign immunity built into the Constitution."5
The Kennedy majority opinion also drew support from the
Constitution's structure. The opinion reasoned that finding
congressional power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity
from suit in its own courts imposes an indignity on the States
and an anomaly in the law. As the Court stated,
Private suits against nonconsenting States ... present "the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties," ...
regardless of the forum. [A] state.., must face the prospect
of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the
disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the power of private
Id. at 2261.
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.. ., shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer thereof.").
114. "[Ihe Supremacy Clause enshrines as 'the supreme Law of the Land' only
those federal Acts that accord with the constitutional design." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at
2255 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2) (citing Printz v.United States, 521 U.S. 898,
924 (1997)). The Supremacy Clause thus leaves to be decided the issue of which
acts of Congress are in accord with constitutional limits. See id. at 2255.
115. The majority, quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24 (1997), held
When a "La[w] ... for carrying into Execution" the Commerce Clause
violates the principle of state sovereign immunity reflected in the various
constitutional provisions ... it is not a "La[w] ... proper for carrying into
Execution the Commerce Clause" and is thus, in the words of the
Federalist, "merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be
treated as such."
Id. at 2256 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at
204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (ellipses and alterations in
Printz)).
For an alternate view, see Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power
to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND.
L. REV. 71, 93 (1998), stating that Congress has constitutional authority to require
states to adjudicate federal claims
to ensure preservation of the primacy and dominance of the federal level of
authority within the federal structure .... No supreme law could exist if state
courts could refuse to enforce valid federal law. Otherwise, the supreme law
would be the law that state courts decide to enforce.
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citizens to levy on its treasury .... 
116
This single observation introduces the four main structural
themes that animate the Alden decision." 7
The first is autonomy. State autonomy suffers when states
must answer for breaches of federal law in federal court, the
majority reasoned, but not so much as when states loose
immunity in their own courts. This is because a state's own
courts have "always been understood to be within the sole
control of the sovereign itself.""' The Court added that
permitting the federal government to force states to hear
federal damage claims against the state in the state's own
courts would place the federal government in a position to
"press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the
other branches of the State [and ultimately] to turn the State
against itself .... ,,n9
The second theme is fiscal stability. Being placed in the
"disfavored status of a debtor," the majority opinion argues,
could "threaten [the] financial integrity [of the States]."' 20 This
was true at the founding, and
[e]ven today an unlimited congressional power to authorize
suits in state court to levy upon the treasuries of the States
for compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and even
punitive damages could create staggering burdens, giving
Congress a power and a leverage over the States that...
would pose a severe and notorious danger to the States and
their resources.
121
116. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264 (quoting Exparte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
117. Commentators view federalism as advancing many different values. See,
e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201 (1998) (discussing political accountability
as an important federalism value); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity
"Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 124-25 (1996) (discussing the "executive
discretion" rationale for sovereign immunity); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty
and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?,
95 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1001, 1060-74 (1995) (arguing that federalism advances the
primary values of decreased tyranny, increased political participation, and
increased experimentation).
118. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2245.
119. Id. at 2264. This, the Court reasoned, creates "substantial costs to the
autonomy, the decision making ability, and the sovereign capacity of the States."
Id. at 2262. A state "is entitled to order the processes of its own governance,
assigning to the political branches rather than the courts, the responsibility for
directing the payment of debts." Id. at 2265.
120. Id. at 2264.
121. Id.
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The third theme is the anomaly of the "national government
... wield[ing] greater power in the state courts than in its own
judicial instrumentalities."" The Court previously had noted
the anomaly concerns," as had some state courts. 4 It would
be an "unprecedented step," the majority in Alden argued, to
infer from the state courts' obligation to enforce federal law
that "Congress's authority to pursue federal objectives through
state judiciaries exceeds not only its power to press other
branches of the State into its service but even its control over
the federal courts themselves." 125
The final theme is the "'unanticipated intervention [of
individuals] in the processes of government. ' ' 26 The majority
opinion reiterates this apprehension. Drafting a state's courts to
enforce federal obligations of the State government could
"ultimately... commandeer the entire political machinery of
the State against its will and at the behest of individuals." 27
"When the States' immunity from private suits is disregarded,
'the course of their public policy and the administration of their
public affairs' may become 'subject to and controlled by the
mandates of judicial tribunals without their consent, and in
favor of individual interests. '"" This, the court concluded,
sacrifices political accountability. 29 Democratic governance
requires that these judgments be made through each state's
political process, not by "judicial decrees mandated by the
122. Id. at 2265.
123. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206 (1991)
(noting that the federal government's exclusive use of state courts to enforce
national policy poses federalism-related concerns); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,
365 (1990) (suggesting that it would be anomalous for a state to be forced to
consider matters Congress is barred from consigning to the federal courts).
124. See, e.g., Bunch v. Robinson, 712 A.2d 585, 592 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)
("It would be anomalous if the 'States' rights' justices who authored Seminole
Tribe, and who had vigorously dissented in Garcia, acted to uphold [the] States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit but, at the same time, affirmed
congressional authority to overcome a state's own sovereign immunity under its
state constitution.").
125. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265.
126. Id. at 2264 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53
(1944)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Exparte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,505 (1887)).
129. See id. at 2264-65 (In an era of "scarce resources among competing needs
and interests," access to the "public fisc" goes to the "heart of the political
process" implicating "difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and political
of judgments.").
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Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen."13 The
Court juxtaposed a suit brought by the United States. These
suits "require the exercise of political responsibility for each
suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a
broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting
states."' 31
The Court rejected the suggestion that it was adding any of
its own preferences into the analysis through these conclusions.
All of this, the majority argued, arises from nothing more than
respecting "what the Framers and those who ratified the
Constitution sought to accomplish when they created a federal
system." 32
The dissent answered the majority's arguments by insisting
that the majority decision was based on false historical claims,
underinclusive selection of historical data, and an erroneous
structural analysis. Specifically, the dissent argued: first, that
"[t]here is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment
constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent
in the notion of statehood;" 133 second, that there is "no evidence
130. Id. at 2245; see also id. at 2265 (Federal governmental assertion of control
"over a State's most fundamental political processes ... strikes at the heart of
political accountability.. ."). The Court seemed alarmed at the proliferation of
federal statutes now regulating the states, a condition that may have aggravated
its concern over the intrusion of individuals into the process of governance. The
Court noted that prior to the enactment of the FELA, Congress had enacted many
statutes authorizing suits in state court, but none "purporting to authorize private
suits against nonconsenting States in state court." Id. at 2261. Following enactment
of the FLSA, however, "similar statutes have multiplied." Id. Soon after the
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, Henry Monaghan observed that the Court's
reasoning in that case might
reflect[ ] a visceral feeling among the majority of the Court that the role of the
states in our federal structure has been so diminished as to become
unintelligible. This feeling would generate an instinctive reaction to protect-
indeed, to create-a role for the states, even if that role became merely
symbolic.
Monaghan, supra note 117, at 120.
131. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. The Court returned to this theme later in its
opinion: "The difference between a suit by the United States on behalf of the
employees and a suit by the employees implicates a rule that the National
government must itself deem the case of sufficient importance to take action
against the State. . . ." Id. at 2269.
132. Id. at 2268.
133. Id. at 2269-70 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that history has
supported many different views of sovereign immunity since the time of the
Declaration of Independence. See id. at 2273 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The story of
the.., development of conceptions of sovereignty is complex and uneven; here it
is enough to say that by the time independence was declared in 1776, the locus of
sovereignty was still an open question. ... "). Similarly, differing opinions existed
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that any concept of inherent sovereign immunity was
understood historically to apply when the sovereign sued was
not the font of the law" under which the suit was brought;
134
third, that there is no evidence that the structure of the
constitution anticipated a unique "scheme of American
federalism" that immunizes the States from individual damage
actions in any court on federal claims;135 and 4) that the
majority's concept of federalism "ignores the accepted
authority of Congress to bind States under [Article I powers]
and to provide for enforcement of federal rights in state
court."
136
after the Revolution. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (showing that after the
Revolution, some states understood they did not possess sovereign immunity
from suit whereas others understood they were the "inheritors of the Crown's
common-law sovereign immunity and so enacted statutes [incorporating that
view]."). Finally, different views of sovereign immunity prevailed during the
ratification debates. See id. at 2275 (Souter, J., dissenting) (showing that in the
" ratification debates ... a variety of views emerged and the diversity of sovereign
immunity conceptions displayed itself"). The dissent found additional support for
its view in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Alden dissent noted
that none of the five opinions in Chisholm articulated the view that "the Tenth
Amendment had been understood to give federal constitutional status to state
sovereign immunity . . . [or otherwise] hinted at a constitutionally immutable
immunity doctrine." See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2279 (Souter, J., dissenting). Rather, all
five opinions in Chisoim, including the dissent, "confirmed that virtually everyone
who understood immunity to be legitimate saw it as a common-law prerogative
(from which it follows that it was subject to abrogation by Congress as to a matter
within Congress's Article I authority)." Id. at 2283 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that
even if the Constitution confers immutable immunity upon the states, the
historical evidence still demonstrated that "it may be invoked only by the
sovereign that is the source of the right upon which suit is brought .... [and] if
the sovereign is not the source of the law to be applied, sovereign immunity has
no applicability." Id. at 2286-87 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, in their own courts
states would be immune on state but not federal causes of action.
135. Id. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent advanced a structural view of
federalism that tracks Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Under that view, the federal and state governments
are sovereign only "with respect to the objects committed to [them but not] with
respect to the objects committed to the other." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting MeCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410). Because one "object"
committed to the Congress is authority to enact the FLSA and apply it to the
states, "the State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the national objective of
the FLSA." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) Nor, argued the dissent, is the McCulloch
view of federalism to be denied because authorizing private suits against
nonconsenting states is offensive to their dignity as sovereigns. The dissent
criticized the majority's vision of sovereign immunity as based on the "'royal
dignity [owed] the prince from his subjects,"' id. at 2289 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *241), a view "inimical to the
republican conception, which rests on the understanding of its citizens precisely
that the government is not above them, but of them, its actions being governed by
law just like their own," id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the
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In short, while each side drew from the historical record, past
practice, and structural concepts to provide it debating points,
these arguments were indeterminate." One might fairly argue
that the most valid understanding of the interpretive process
deployed in Alden is that a majority of the Court preferred state
autonomy, fiscal predictability, and political accountability,
and disapproved of individuals' ability to influence the course
of government through litigation.'38
B. College Savings Bank I and Ih: Circumscribing
Congress's Section 5 Power
The two College Savings Bank cases represent another
installment of the doctrinal shift over the past five years
limiting Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Previously, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,140 the Court
had held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to abrogate States's immunity from suit in
majority's argument that because no disputes over a state court's duty to hear
federal claims brought against that state appear in the historical record, such a
duty has never existed. The short answer to this claim, the dissent argued, is that
not until modem times has Congress's Commerce Power been understood to
include binding state governments. See id. at 2291. Thus the Framers' sUrprise
over the federal governments' authority to provide suit on federal claims in state
court is surpassed only by the "astonish[ment] [over] the reach of Congress under
the Commerce Clause generally." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. See Lewis, supra note 16 (The Court "picked out shards of doctrine to
justify what was plainly a preconceived conclusion."); Jeffrey Rosen, The Age of
Mixed Results, 220 NEW REPUBLIC 43, June 28, 1999, at 43 (reviewing CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999)) (referring to the "unsettling cynicism about the malleability of legal
argument"). But see Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1725 (noting that although the
historical evidence regarding whether states were to enjoy immunity from suit in
federal court is indeterminate, the record does point to one point of agreement:
"An arrangement under which the states [sic] courts would have been required to
entertain suits seeking damages against the states on the basis of federal law,
subject to Supreme Court review, would not have satisfied anyone.").
138. See Richard H. Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997)
It is clear.., that neither the intent of a group of lawmakers nor the original
meaning of a legal text is a simple historical fact awaiting discovery by
diligent researchers.... [F]ixing the relevant intent of a multi-member body
... is a constructive enterprise from which an interpreter's assumptions,
values, and goals can never be excluded entirely.
Id.; Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1723 ("In the end, the disagreement [over the scope
of state sovereign immunity] . . . is not so much about history as about the relative
weight constitutional interpreters should give to other types of arguments,
including arguments about... constitutional structure and principle.").
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. This Section provides, "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
140. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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federal court."' Seminole Tribe added the requirement that a
reviewing court must determine whether Congress
"'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the
immunity' [and whether Congress acted] 'pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.' " " Thus in every case, the plaintiff asserting
that Congress has abrogated state judicial immunity through
the exercise of Section 5 authority must establish that the
exercise of power was valid in the circumstances. This task was
made more arduous by the Court's 1997 holding in City of
Boerne v. Flores.1
43
In Boerne, the Court held that Congress lacked Section 5
authority to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA). 44 RFRA imposed greater restrictions on state and
local interference with religious freedom than the Fourteenth
Amendment requires. 45 The case focused on the scope of
Congress's Section 5 power to "enforce" the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. On the one hand, "Congress has [no]
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause." 46 On the other hand, "[legislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of
Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into
'legislative spheres of authority previously reserved to the
States." 47
141. See id. at 452-56.
142. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985)).
143. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (1994).
145. RFRA reversed the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), by providing that laws that "substantially
burden" the exercise of religion are unlawful unless they advance a "compelling
governmental interest" and are "the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a),(b). The Boerne Court
read Smith to hold that "neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to
religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
interest." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514.
146. Boerne, 521 US at 519. ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right
by changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."). Congress's
power is "corrective or preventive, not definitional." Id. at 525.
147. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
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The Court concluded that "RFRA cannot be considered
remedial, preventative legislation, if those terms are to have
any meaning." 148 In so holding, the Court introduced what has
come to be referred to as the "congruence and proportionality"
test. "There must be congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect."149 At a minimum, this test
requires a demonstration that the true aim of federal legislation
enacted pursuant to the Section 5 power is the elimination of
state action that the Supreme Court is prepared to conclude is
unconstitutional.
15°
Federal civil rights legislation made applicable to the states
has been upheld in the lower courts against state challenges to
Congress's Section 5 power. This is true of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),' 5' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
148. Id. at 532 ("RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections."). The legislative record in RFRA failed to
demonstrate any contemporary evidence of state-sponsored targeting of religious
practices in American society. To the contrary, the Court found that [t]he history
of [religious] persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no
episodes occurring in the past 40 years." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. This "absence of
more recent episodes" was explained by evidence in the legislative record,
introduced by RFRA's proponents, that "'deliberate persecution is not the usual
problem in this country,"' id. (quoting from Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 334 (1993) (statement of Douglas
Laycock)), and "'[l]aws targeting religious practices have become increasingly
rare,"' id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 2 (1993)).
149. Id. at 520. The Court suggested the test follows from the reasoning of the
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883): "Remedial legislation under § 5 'should be
adapted to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was
intended to provide against."' Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (quoting The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 13) (alterations in original).
150. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1108
(M.D. Ala. 1998)
The teaching of Boerne is that there must be a substantial constitutional hook:
The principal object of the legislation must be to address rights that are
judicially recognized; Congress can prohibit conduct that is not
unconstitutional, but such legislation must be nothing more than incidental to
a primary effort of prohibiting conduct that is unconstitutional .... [T]he
prohibited constitutional conduct must be, at most, always a bridesmaid and
never the bride; the bride must always be the unconstitutional conduct.
Id.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Several circuits have held states liable
under the ADA. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional
Servs., 176 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999) (2-1 opinion) (holding that Congress has
Section 5 power to apply Title II of the ADA to state prisons); Seaborn v. Florida,
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1964,52 and other legislation prohibiting discrimination. 3
That could change as courts more clearly understand the
demands of the Boerne test."M The Section 5 power is
unavailable to enact business legislation, such as copyright,
trademark, and patent legislation, because no fair case can be
made that the aim of such legislation is enforcement of the
143 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S. CL 1038 (1999); Autio v. AFSCME
Local 3139, 157 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (evenly divided vote of the
court affirming Congress's power under Section 5 to enact the ADA); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (2-1 opinion), affd. on other
grounds, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998)
(2-1 opinion), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 819 (1998); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267
(9th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th
Cir. 1997); see also Torres v. Puerto Rico Tourism Co., 175 F.3d 1, 6 n.7 (1st Cir.
1999) (declining to address the Section 5 issue but stating in dicta "we have
considered the issue of Congress's authority sufficiently to conclude that, were we
to confront the question head-on, we almost certainly would join the majority of
courts upholding the [abrogation] provision."). But see Brown v. North Carolina
Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (2-1 opinion) (holding that
regulation promulgated pursuant to Title II of the ADA prohibiting states from
charging fees for issuance of parking placards permitting use of handicapped
parking spaces is beyond Congress's Section 5 power).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). For cases holding that Congress
possesses Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from Title VII
claims in federal court see Reynolds, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092, and Carman v. San
Francisco United Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that
Congress possesses Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from
Title VII claims in federal court).
153. Courts generally find Section 5 power to enact federal statutes prohibiting
discrimination in federally financed programs. This is true of Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20OOd-7(a)(1) (1994). See Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213
(5th Cir. 1998); Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Bryant v.
New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. NJ. 1998). Congress's power to
enforce the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) has similarly been
upheld. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267,1270 (9th Cir. 1997); Nihiser v. Ohio
Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (collecting
cases); Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1994
& Supp. 1998) is also enforceable under Section 5. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 823-24 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding IDEA to be within
Congress's Section 5 power based on an analysis of the Boerne congruence and
proportionality test); id. at 827 n.7 (collecting cases).
154. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), the Court held
Congress lacks Section 5 power to extend the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act's provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994), to the states. James Pfander has
made the point that
Congress adopted many of the extant abrogations before Seminole Tribe was
decided and did not clearly address the Fourteenth Amendment in the course
of its legislative findings. Accordingly, some federal courts have simply
refused to reach the Fourteenth Amendment issue on the ground that
Congress did not invoke its powers in support of a particular abrogation.
Pfander, supra note 68, at 191 n.124. Seizing on Pfander's observation, one might
add that Congress's failure to address Fourteenth Amendment concerns could
defeat the effort to demonstrate that the real aim of a statute is to remedy or
prevent Fourteenth Amendment violations, as Boerne now requires.
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equal protection of the laws. 55
However, because patent, trademark, copyright, and perhaps
other categories of federal law create species of property, a fair
question is whether state infringement of these property rights
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process that
Congress can remedy through its Section 5 power. This was the
plaintiff's theory in the two actions adjudicated in federal
district court in College Savings Bank I and II.
In 1994, College Savings Bank brought two separate actions
against the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, an entity the parties agreed was an arm of the state of
Florida. 56 One action alleged patent infringement'5 7 and the
other alleged false advertising under the trademark laws.5
After Seminole Tribe, federal jurisdiction in these cases
depended upon College Savings Bank being able to
demonstrate that Congress possesses Section 5 authority to
enact the federal rights advanced in these two cases. College
Savings Bank argued that the federal rights it asserted were
valid exercises of Congress's Section 5 power because each
right was designed to secure the Fourteenth Amendment's
protections against deprivations of property without due
process of law.'5 9 The district court agreed with respect to the
patent infringement claim 60 but not the false advertising
claim,16' and the Third Circuit affirmed. 62
155. See discussion infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text. The same is true
with respect to bankruptcy legislation. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Hosp. v.
Pennsylvania, 133 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the Bankruptcy Clause as a
source of abrogation authority and holding that bankruptcy statutes are not
enacted pursuant to any other constitutional authority); id. at 244 (collecting
cases).
156. See College Sav. BankI, 119 S. Ct. 2199,2202-03 & nn.1 & 3 (1999).
157. See id. at 2203 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
158. See College Say. Bank 11, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2221 (1999) (citing the Trademark
Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1990)).
159. See College Say. Bank I, 119 S. Ct. at 2204 (arguing for the validity of the
patent action); College Sav. BankI, 119 S. Ct. at 2224 (arguing for the validity of the
trademark action).
160. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400,425-26 (D. N.J. 1996).
161. See id. at 427-28.
162- See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
148 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (3d Cir. 1998) (patent claim); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 131 F.3d 353, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1997)
(trademark claim). College Savings Bank also argued that the district court had
jurisdiction over its false advertising claim because defendant had constructively
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by administering a tuition
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The Supreme Court rejected the due process theories in both
cases. In College Savings Bank I, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, acknowledged that patents are property
subject to the protection of the Due Process Clause."6 But, the
majority held that the federal patent laws could not be viewed
as remedial or preventive legislation aimed at securing the
protections of the patent owner's due process rights. First, the
legislative record contained no evidence of any pattern of
patent infringement by state governments, undermining the
"proposition that Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth
Amendment violation by enacting the [patent laws].""6
Second, a due process violation consists of a deprivation
without due process of law, not just a deprivation. A state's
patent infringement thus violates due process "only where the
State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to
injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent...
,,165 The legislative history, the Court observed, indicated that
"Congress . . . barely considered the availability of state
remedies for patent infringement .... 66 Finally, the patent
laws define infringement to include both intentional and
unintentional conduct, but the Fourteenth Amendment concept
of deprivation of property does not include negligent acts.
67
Yet, "Congress did not focus on instances of intentional or
reckless infringement on the part of the States" when it
extended the patent laws to them,'8 providing further evidence
that Congress's aim in enacting the patent laws was not to
address unconstitutional conduct.169 "The statute's apparent...
aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent
prepayment program designed to provide individuals with funds to cover future
college expenses. See College Say. Bank II, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. This argument was
rejected by both lower courts. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 416-20 (D. NJ. 1996), affd 131
F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997).
163. See College Say. Bank I, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 ("Patents ... have long been
considered a species of property.").
164. Id. at 2208; see also id. at 2207 (reviewing the legislative history of the Act).
165. Id. at 2208-09 ("The primary point made by [congressional] witnesses ...
was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they
were less convenient than federal remedies.").
166. Id. at 2209.
167. See id. at 2209-10.
168. Id. at 2209.
169. See id. at 2210 (concluding that "Congress appears to have enacted this
legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that
do not necessarily violate the Constitution.").
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infringement and to place States on the same footing as private
parties under that regime." ' 7° While these may be proper
Article I goals, the majority argued, they do not provide
Congress Section 5 authority.171
College Savings Bank 11172 never reached the Section 5 analysis
required by Boerne. The Court rejected the claim that the false
advertising provisions of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham
Act) enforced the requirements of Due Process because it held
that the right not to be victimized by false advertising is not a
property right. "The hallmark of a protected property interest
is the right to exclude others." "73 While provisions dealing with
infringements of trademarks may protect constitutionally
cognizable property interests, "[t]he Lanham Act's false-
advertising provisions.., bear no relationship to any right to
exclude." 74
Nor can participation in the interstate commerce of
administering a tuition prepayment program be deemed a
waiver of a state's judicial immunity, according to the Court.
College Savings Bank had argued that if Congress makes clear
that a state will be subject to suit in federal court if it engages in
conduct governed by a particular federal statute, and if the
state voluntarily elects to engage in that conduct, it should be
deemed to have waived its judicial immunity.' 75 The majority
rejected constructive waiver of sovereign immunity as a
permissible constitutional principle. First, "there is little reason
to assume actual consent based upon the State's mere presence
in a field subject to congressional regulation," 176 and second,
"[riecognizing a congressional power to exact constructive
170. Id. at 2211.
171. See id.
172. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
173. Id. at 2224.
174. Id. at 2224-25. The act of engaging in business, the thing which is impinged
by false advertising, also is not property. See id. at 2225.
175. See id. at 2228. The College Savings Bank conceded that a state can never be
deemed to have constructively waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in
activities that it cannot realistically choose to abandon, such as operation of a
police force; but constructive waiver is appropriate where a State runs an
enterprise for profit, operates in a field traditionally occupied by private
persons or corporations, [or] engages in activities sufficiently removed from
core [state] functions ....
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id.
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waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of Article I
powers would ... as a practical matter, permit Congress to
circumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole Tribe."177
IV. THE ALDEN TRILOGY AS A MASTERPIECE OF PRAGMATISM
By deciding the Alden Trilogy as it did, the Supreme Court
astutely avoided many thorny constitutional issues whose
resolution would necessitate a considerable investment of
judicial effort and create an appreciable risk of federal-state
conflict. The decision in Alden demonstrates the point well.
As the majority argued, a contrary result in Alden would
have created the anomaly of the "national government ...
wield[ing] greater power in the state courts than in its own
judicial instrumentalities."'78 Such a strategy to enforce federal
statutory rights is problematic. First, one reasonably could
expect that many state officials would consider federal
commandeering of a state's own courts a greater intrusion on
state sovereignty than compelling states to appear before
federal courts. A certain degree of resistance to such
commandeering is plausible. How would the federal
government force an unwilling state court to hear private
damage claims against the state? It is not exactly like ordering
in riot-trained units of the 101st Airborne Division to
desegregate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas,
contrary to the wishes of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus. If
Federal Executive Branch coercion were an unrealistic option,
then the federal judiciary would need to perform the task,
although it would undermine the Seminole Tribe majority's
commitment to federal judicial abstention, to say nothing of the
awkwardness of a federal judge placing a state court under a
mandatory federal injunction to hear a case it refuses to hear.
Even though outright revolt by the states is remote, the
possibility of bias and procedural unfairness in state court
proceedings certainly is not. 79 Once state courts become the
177. Id. at 2229; see also id. at 2230 ("[C]onstructive waiver is little more than
abrogation under another name.").
178. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2265 (1999).
179. Martha Field deftly observed that it would be a questionable strategy for
Congress to rely on state courts to enforce federal claims against the state, even if
it were constitutional to do so, because of the political pressure state courts would
face, including the state court judges' need for re-election. See Martha A. Field, The
No. 2]
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exclusive repository of judicial authority to enforce federal
rights through private damage claims against the states, the
federal government necessarily must guarantee the integrity of
these state courts. From the point of view of the Alden majority,
such a federal oversight function would seem structurally
undesirable and institutionally unworkable. Claims of bias and
procedural unfairness by the state courts would find their way
to the Supreme Court through appeals to the Court from
adverse state court decisions.' 80 The Supreme Court would
become the exclusive source of federal judicial review of state
court compliance.' 8' This role soon could overwhelm its docket,
would require the fashioning of a myriad of compliance rules,
and easily could subject the Court to criticism, both from the
state governments and court systems being monitored and
from dissatisfied claimants. The Alden Trilogy nicely avoids all
of these problems.
Beyond difficulties stemming from recalcitrance, a contrary
result in Alden would have required the Supreme Court to
address some stubborn procedural issues. As Martin Redish
and Steven Sklaver have noted, "a natural question that arises
concerns the extent to which state courts, in adjudicating
federal claims, should be required to employ federal
procedures." 82 This "converse Erie" problem'" has received
little attention from the Court.18' Dice v. Akron, Canton
Youngstown Railroad'8 strongly suggests that state courts must
comply if Congress provides that particular procedures be
employed in litigation of federal claims in state court.'86 A more
Meaning of Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1365,1376 (1997).
180. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496
U.S. 18, 30-31, 30 n.13 (1990) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment presents no
bar to Supreme Court review of federal questions arising in state court litigation
(citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821))).
181. Cf. Pfander, supra note 68, at 166 (proposing and defending the
constitutionality of federal legislation "to empower the intermediate federal
courts of appeal to hear appeals from state courts in any case otherwise within
federal power that the Eleventh Amendment shifts away from federal trial court
cognizance").
182. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 115, at 99.
183. See Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1551 (1961).
184. See Redish & Sklaver, supra note 115, at 100.
185. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
186. But see Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of
State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 55 (1999) ("[Piroposals to federalize state
court procedures in state tort actions are unconstitutional.").
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nettlesome-and more likely-problem arises when
congressional intent is unclear regarding the rules of procedure
to be employed. Current Court precedent provides no clear
answer.18 7 In Johnson v. Fankell88 a state obligation to provide
an interlocutory appeal upon denial of immunity in a § 1983
action was decided in favor of the state because the denial of
interlocutory appeal was not "outcome determinative."1 9 In
Felder v. Casey,'9° a state was required to abandon its notice of
claim rule, which shortened the normal statute of limitations in
§ 1983 actions, because the requirement "burdens the exercise
of the federal right" contrary to the "compensatory aims of
federal civil rights law."' 9' In Dice, the Court applied "some
form of systemic balancing approach to the converse-Erie
question." 92
The Supreme Court's cobbling together of ad hoc results is
questionable federalism policy even when virtually all federal
claims are brought to federal court. It is wholly unworkable in
the Seminole Tribe era. Had Alden been decided differently, state
courts would have experienced an abundant influx of private
damage actions to enforce federal rights against the state. The
inevitable result would have been an increased demand on the
Supreme Court to mediate the fairness of local procedural rules
at a time when the Court's precedent is somewhat chaotic. This
is no-win work for the Court. Either the Court imposes federal
procedural rules on discontented state court judges and
officials or it abandons plaintiffs to the vicissitudes and
burdens of local rules. The Alden decision liberated the Court
from this trap.
Perhaps the most prickly problem avoided by denying
Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
a state's own courts was the problem of developing a
jurisprudence of valid excuse. One may recall that in Howlett v.
Rose,'93 the Court reiterated the oft-cited rule that because
187. See Redish & Sklaver, supra note 115, at 101 ("At various times the
Supreme Court appears to have chosen among... different models in order to
resolve the converse-Erie question....").
188. 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
189. Id. at 920.
190. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
191. Id. at 141.
192. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 115, at 102.
193. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
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federal law is the law in each of the states and because state
courts are bound to enforce it in conformance with the
Constitution, state courts have a responsibility to enforce
federal law "in the absence of 'valid excuse. '""' 4 While it is clear
that discrimination against federal law is not a valid excuse,1 95
it also is clear that "the general rule 'bottomed deeply in belief
in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is
that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.
'" 9 6
Because state courts may enforce "a neutral state rule regarding
the administration of the courts,"19' the question in each case is
whether state courts normally enforce the "same types of
claims" arising under state law.198
In Alden, petitioners contended that Maine had discriminated
against federal rights by waiving its sovereign immunity with
respect to certain state statutory wage and hour provisions
while refusing to waive its immunity from suit in state court
with respect to the FLSA's wage and hour provisions. The
majority avoided the discrimination issue by deciding that the
194. Id. at 369; see also id. at 370 n.16
[O]ur cases confirm that state courts have the coordinate authority and
consequent responsibility to enforce the supreme law of the land .... [and]
also presuppose that state courts presumptively have the obligation to apply
federal law to a dispute before them and may not deny a federal right in the
absence of a valid excuse.
Id.; accord Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,136-
37(1876).
195. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 371-81; see also McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco
R.R. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934) ("[The Federal Constitution prohibits state
courts of general jurisdiction from refusing [to hear a case] solely because the suit
is brought under a federal law."). As the Court explained in McKnett, because the
state court had "general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which [the action]
here brought belongs," the refusal to hear the FELA action constituted
discrimination against rights arising under federal laws in violation of the
Supremacy Clause. McKnett, 292 U.S. at 232; accord Mondou v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (the state may not discriminate
against federal law when state courts have jurisdiction "appropriate to the
occasion." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
196. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372 (quoting Henry Hart, The Relations Between Stale and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,508 (1954)).
197. Id. at 372. As the Court in Howlett explained, "the requirement that a state
court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not
necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a court competent
to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented." Id.
198. Testa, 330 U.S. at 394. In Howlelt, Florida had no valid excuse because its
courts are courts of general jurisdiction with authority to hear private damage
claims and enter judgment against school boards under a wide variety of state
causes of action, including matters of the type presented in § 1983 litigation. See
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378-81.
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valid excuse doctrine does not apply to a state's choices of
when it will consent to suit, absent evidence "that the State has
manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to
discriminate against federal causes of action."' As the Court
explained, "To the extent that Maine has chosen to consent to
certain classes of suits while maintaining its immunity from
others, it has done no more than exercise a privilege of
sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity from
suit."200
Alden thus split the valid excuse doctrine. For private state
court damage actions on federal claims brought against the
state, the states are free to decide when they will consent to suit
and on what terms, absent evidence "the State has manipulated
its immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate against
federal causes of action."20' For all other federal claims brought
by individuals in state court, the question in each case is
whether state courts enforce the "same types of claims" when
they arise under state law. 02 This distinction, available to the
Court only because it decided the state court immunity issue in
Alden the way it did, nicely avoids the necessity of hearing
appeals over whether federal claims against a state that a state
court refuses to hear are the "same types" of claims against the
state arising under state law that state courts do hear. These
issues are fact intensive and can turn on fine distinctions.
0 3
199. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2268 (1999).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202- See discussion supra note 97 and accompanying text.
203. In Alden, petitioners argued that Maine had discriminated against federal
law because its state courts are courts of general jurisdiction and are authorized to
hear suits against the State of Maine that are "analogous" to the FLSA overtime
claim at issue in Alden. See Brief for Petitioner (Private parties) at 34-35, Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (No. 98436). The analogous suits were claims against
the state for late payment of wages and minimum wage, and claims under a state
whistle blower law, a family medical leave act, a human rights act, and a state
workers compensation act. See id. at 35-36. The State of Maine responded by
arguing that the court was required to focus on the "most analogous state law
claim." Brief for Respondent at 46-47, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (No.
98-436). Because the FLSA action arose out of an overtime dispute, Maine argued
that the most analogous state statute was the state's overtime statute, which
exempted state public employees from its coverage. See id.; see also Brief for
Respondent (United States) at 25, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (No. 98-
436) ("[A] finding of discrimination does not depend on the existence of a state
claim that is identical to the federal claim in every detail. Rather, discrimination
exists when the State entertains suits of the same general type [such as] state-law
monetary claims against the State.").
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Even if the Court were able to craft workable standards, the
Court would not likely be able to review enough cases to police
the system thoroughly. Uniformity would likely collapse or
suffer severely, as would the deterrence that comes from
certainty of review. Given this, a majority of the Court might
have concluded that it is better to preclude access to state
courts than permit it when federal judicial oversight is so
fragmentary.
In addition, had Alden been decided differently, plaintiffs
throughout the United States would have been subjected to a
patchwork quilt of enforcement. Whether or not a plaintiff
could bring a damage claim against a state in state court based
on a federal cause of action would have depended on whether
the employee worked in a state whose courts hear the same
type of suits against the state under state law. Not only would
such a system create two classes of federal-rights holders, but
states would have been presented a strong incentive to repeal
state statutes waiving sovereign immunity on state claims to
avoid being subjected to federal damage claims against them.2°
Alden itself creates the risk of nonuniform enforcement to the
extent that some states, but not others, will consent to the FLSA
and other federal suits in state court. This two-tier effect was
slight when Alden was decided 2 5 but, in any event, could
evaporate quickly should most states refuse to consent to
federal damage actions in the future.
V. THE ALDEN TPJLOGYAS AN EXERCISE IN MISDIRECTION
Sometimes it is useful to suspend emphasis on decisional
rhetoric and instead identify the winners and losers in
litigation. The Alden Trilogy undoubtedly is a significant victory
for advocates of states' rights. Alden frees states from
congressional efforts to abrogate states' immunity in their own
courts. The two College Savings Bank cases stifle efforts to
204. The State of Maine made this latter point to the Court in Alden. See Brief for
Respondent at 49, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (No. 98-436) ("Petitioners'
approach is short-sighted because it simply encourages States to close their doors
to all state claims to avoid the prospect that any waiver of the States's sovereign
immunity could be treated as an 'analogous' statute which requires the state
courts to hear federal claims ....").
205. It is problematic to claim that states have consented widely to private suits
against them on federal claims. See discussion infra notes 228-35 and
accompanying text.
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deploy the Due Process Clause as a means to empower
Congress to enact business legislation applicable to the states
through Section 5. College Savings Bank II ends constructive
waiver as a viable constitutional theory.a 6 Obscured by the
glow of this states' rights victory, however, is an understanding
of the Alden Trilogy's other winners.
First, the Trilogy enhances the enforcement role of the
executive branch of the national government. Now, only the
national government has authority to sue the states for
damages resulting from violations of Article I-based federal
rights.20 7 Accordingly, the federal government controls the
timing, strategy, parties, and amount and type of damages
sought in litigation initiated against the states. For example, the
Department of Labor now is the litigation czar of damage
actions against the states in FLSA wage and overtime matters.
The same is true with respect to every other federal agency
authorized to bring damage claims against the states pursuant
to legislation enacted solely through Congress's Article I
powers.
Second, the Trilogy and other recent federalism cases
strengthen the Supreme Court's policymaking role. Boerne and
College Savings Bank I and II, decided within a period of just
over two years, evidence the Court's commitment to play an
active role in setting limits on Congress's use of Section 5. The
Boernel College Savings Bank analytical approach for evaluating
the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation provides the Court
ample opportunity to interject its policy preferences into the
outcomes.08 In short, the Trilogy redistributes power not only
from the federal government to the states, but also, at the
federal level, from the legislative to the judicial branch.2 9
206. See discussion supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
207. See discussion infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
208. In Section 5 litigation, the Court defines the Fourteenth Amendment right
whose enforcement must be the legislation's purpose, it evaluates the legislative
record for evidence Congress similarly understood the right and assembled
evidence of its infringement by the states, and it determines whether the evidence
of state infringement is sufficiently ample to meet the "congruence and
proportionality' test. See discussion supra notes 143-71 and accompanying text.
209. Vicki Jackson has noted that recent federalism decisions prior to Alden also
could be understood as reinforcing the Supreme Court's powers by positioning
the Court as "the only federal court able to interpret certain federal laws
applicable to the states.' Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur d'Alene, Federal Courts and the
Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and
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The Trilogy's focus on Congress's remedial authority also
misdirects attention. Taken at face value, the Trilogy appears
only to address Congress's ability to provide remedies, not
Congress's substantive lawmaking authority.21 Not once did
the Trilogy question Garcia's commitment that the legislature,
not the judiciary, should modulate Congress's exercise of its
power to regulate the states as part of a program that affects
states and private parties alike.21 But understanding the Trilogy
to be only about Congress's remedial authority is myopic for
two reasons.
The first reason is that the Trilogy contains subtle but strong
incentives for Congress to amend federal legislation to
eliminate provisions that preempt state law. Even after the
Trilogy, under Garcia, Congress retains authority to enact
federal standards that preempt state law. This retained power
is highly controversial, and very worrisome to many local
officials, particularly as recent federal legislation has
preempted local law in such important areas as electronic
commerce, tort reform, electric utility deregulation, and
telecommunications regulation. 1 2 For example, the Copyright
Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 301, 324 (1998). Jackson reasons that the
palpable expansion over the past 30 years of federal laws applicable to the states
may explain the Court's strong motivation to position itself in that way. She
argues that although "a complex set of reasons," id. at 303, explains this expansion
of federal legislation regulating state activity, three reasons predominate. First, the
expansion of state governments' size and scope resulted in states increasingly
engaging in the types of activities that subject the private sector to federal
regulation. Congress yielded to arguments that states ought to be regulated the
same as other legal players. The result was "Congress extended a variety of
federal statutes to the states, including minimum wage laws, anti-discrimination
laws, environmental laws, bankruptcy, and copyright laws." Id. Second, during
the last part of this century, the rights revolution "reinvigorat[ed] ... the
Fourteenth Amendment as a constraint on state activities" resulting in increased
claims for "equality of treatment" and concomitantly decreased ability of the
States to "claim[ I ...immunity from federal law.' Id. at 303-04. Third, the
"collective political sense" of the distinction between what is private and what is
public "dissipate[d]." Id. at 304.
210. In Alden, the Court explained that the Tenth Amendment limits Congress's
authority to provide judicial remedies against the state, but a state's "privilege...
to assert its sovereign immunity ... does not confer upon [it] a concomitant right
to disregard the Constitution or a valid federal law." Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct.
2240,2266 (1999).
211. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,160 (1992).
212 See Regulation of Federal Preemption of State Laws: Hearings on S. 1214 Before
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Rep.
John Dorso, Chair of the Law and Justice Committee of the National Conference of
State Legislatures) available in 1999 WL 20010053 (discussing the adverse effects
on state and local government from these legislative initiatives); Regulation of
Federal Preemption of State Laws: Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Senate Comm. on
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Act of 1976 preempts all state copyright laws.213 However,
copyright infringement suits for damages against the states in
federal court are barred by Seminole Tribe and College Savings
Bank I. If Congress were to amend the copyright laws to
eliminate the exclusive federal jurisdiction federal courts now
enjoy,214 under Alden a remedy would only exist when states
consent to suit. By refusing to consent, states could exert
considerable pressure on Congress because victims of state
copyright infringement soon would demand relief. It is
plausible that Congress might react by repealing the Copyright
Act's preemption provisions, thus permitting each state to go
its own way, at least with respect to damages. If one applies
this reasoning to trademark, patent, electronic commerce,
telecommunications regulation, and the myriad of other federal
legislation caught in the web of Seminole Tribe, Boerne, and the
Alden Trilogy, states suddenly have much more autonomy than
they did before the Trilogy.215
Understanding the Trilogy to be only about Congress's
remedial authority is myopic for a second reason. While
Seminole Tribe, Boerne, and the Trilogy appear to preserve
Congress's substantive authority to extend the requirements of
federal law to the states through its Article I powers, these
cases effectively thwart Congress's ability to impose liability on
the states for violations of those obligations. Without liability,
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Mayor Alexander G. Fekete,
Vice-Chair Finance, Administration and Intergovernmental Relations Steering
Committee of the National League of Cities), available in 1999 WL 20010054 ("It is
the National League of Cities' highest priority to put a meaningful check on this
preemption of state and local authority.").
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding state statute limiting to 42 days the
maximum permissible duration of an exclusive licensing agreement between
federal copyright holder and motion picture film exhibitor preempted by § 301 of
the Copyright Act of 1976); Lowell Wolf, States' Eleventh Amendment Defense Against
Copyright Infringement and Plaintiffs' Alternative Remedies, 11 WHITHER L. REV. 885,
901-02 & n.153 (1990) ("Consistent with its goal to create a nationally unified
copyright system, Congress enacted section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976
which states that 'no person is entitled to any [copyright] or equivalent right in
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."' (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994))).
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
215. Admittedly, this implicit pressure on Congress to eliminate preemption
applies only to the preemptive effect on state law of federal legislation that
regulates the states themselves, and not regulating the private sector. Still, if the
Trilogy has this hidden substantive effect on Congress, this would be a federalism
bonus far exceeding just remedy.
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the dictates of federal law are reduced to exhortations.2 6
Depreciating regulatory authority to an exhortation disables it
as surely as precluding its exercise altogether.2 7  In other
words, eliminating the remedy effectively eliminates the
substantive right.
VI. THE ALDEN TRILOGY AS INSULATING THE
STATES FROM LIABILITY
Those who claim that the Constitution bars Congress from
providing a damage remedy against states to enforce federal
rights confront an awkward philosophical and political
obstacle: federal rights become illusory and states therefore
enjoy an exemption from liability not available to other legal
actors. Prior to Alden, the Supreme Court could, and did, soften
the blow of denying plaintiffs a federal forum by suggesting
that plaintiffs still could enforce federal rights in state court.
215
216. Prior to the Trilogy, others had observed that cases that nominally restrict
Congress's remedial authority may, in fact, work as proxies for limiting
Congress's substantive authority. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 117, at 1007 ("For
those who decry the significant expansion of federal power over the past half
century [the Court's] bright anti-commandeering line might be a welcome second
best strategy."); Jackson, supra note 209, at 323 stating that the "retrenchment of
federal judicial power... can be understood, in part, as symbolic acts of resistence
to political, economic and informational centralization'); Monaghan, supra note
117, at 102 (stating that a "narrow, but solid, five-Justice majority' has engaged in
a seamless effort to constrict congressional power relating both to remedy and
substance).
217. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 PA. L. REV. 457, 460 (1992) ("The truism that there is
no right without a remedy can be more usefully stated in the form that the reality
of the right depends on the effectiveness of the remedy.").
This claim, that limiting Congress's remedial power is a proxy for controlling
substantive lawmaking authority, should not be confused with an assertion that
(in effect) Alden has overruled Garcia completely. Under the National League of
Cities regime that Garcia overruled, the Tenth Amendment was viewed as
immunizing both state and local governments from Congress's substantive
regulatory authority. The Alden Court declared that "[tihe constitutional privilege
of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon
the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law."
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2266 (1999).
218. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 285-87 (1973)
(finding that although Congress had not adequately manifested an intent to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity in federal court when enacting an
amendment extending the FlSA to public employees, that fact did not render the
amendment "meaningless" because the amendment "[a]rguably ... permits
[employee] suits in the Missouri courts"); id. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment) ("[T]he [Missouri] courts ... have an independent constitutional
obligation to entertain employee actions to enforce [FLSA] rights."); see also
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 n.2 (1985) (arguing that the
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Alden now precludes that mollification. Other means are
needed to avoid the rule of law problems that the Alden Trilogy
creates. Alden, like Seminole Tribe before it,219 acknowledged
these rule of law problems' 0 and proffered several "ample
means to correct ongoing violations of law and to vindicate the
interests which animate the Supremacy Clause."' These
alternatives include the following: (1) consent by states; (2)
suits against "lesser entities" that are not an "arm of the state";
(3) suits brought by the federal government; (4) suits for
prospective relief brought against state officers in their official
capacities; and (5) suits for damages brought against state
officers in their individual capacities.'m These alternatives,
however, are not adequate to fill the enforcement void that the
Court's recent federalism cases create.
A. Consent
In Alden, the Court stated that "[m]any states, on their own
initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of
suits. The rigors of sovereign immunity are thus 'mitigated by a
sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the
suability of the sovereign."' tm The Court offered no empirical
evidence to support this claim. James Pflander has reported
that "virtually every state in the country has overthrown the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to some extent and... [t]he
sheer availability of state-court dockets helps to solve the
problem of sovereign immunity ... ."' He argues that because
dissent's assertion that the absence of a federal forum to prosecute federal claims
will exempt the state from compliance
wholly misconceives our federal system .... '[T]he issue is not the general
immunity of the States from private suit... but merely the susceptibility of
the States to suit before federal tribunals.' It denigrates the judges who serve on
the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the
land.
Employees, 411 U.S. at 293-94 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)) (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
219. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,71 n.14 (1996).
220. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 ("Sovereign immunity ... does not bar all
judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law.").
221. Id. at 2268.
222. Id. at 2267-68. The Court also included Section 5 suits. See id. at 2267.
Hampered by Boerne and its progeny, the Section 5 power is not likely to be
available except for some legislation that prohibits discrimination. See discussion
supra notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
223. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47,53 (1944)).
224. Pfander, supra note 68, at 172-73.
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many states have waived sovereign immunity for state law
actions in tort, contract, and tax refund, the valid excuse
doctrine and the nondiscrimination principle that undergirds it
will secure state court forums to prosecute federal damage
claims against the states.2 Alden undermines this otherwise
cogent reasoning. States now are free to decide when they will
consent to suit and on what terms, absent "evidence that the
State has manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to
discriminate against federal causes of action." 226 Thus in most
cases it does not matter if a state waives its sovereign immunity
in state tort or contract actions because a state may withhold
consent on similar federal claims.2 7
It is unlikely that many states have consented to suit in their
own courts on damage claims by individuals alleging violation
of federal rights. Alden makes plain that Maine, for example,
has not consented to FLSA overtime actions. Alden-type
litigation was routine prior to the Trilogy.3 In addition to
Maine, cases were brought in Arkansas, Florida, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.229 One can say with
reasonable assurance that in these states there was no waiver of
sovereign immunity permitting state courts to hear damage
claims based on the federal causes of action in those cases.
Otherwise, there would have been no need to litigate whether
nonconsenting states can be sued for damages in state court-
the issue in these cases.
Only a thorough state-by-state analysis can provide a full
understanding of state waiver of sovereign immunity for
damage actions brought on federal claims. Some of that work
has begun. It shows that waivers of sovereign immunity
normally are drawn narrowly and seldom include waiver of
individual damage actions based on federal law. This is true,
225. See id. at 173 ("[T]he Court can now secure an original docket [in state
court] for federal claims simply by applying . . . [the] principle of
nondiscrimination.").
226. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
227. In Alden, for example, the Court never addressed petitioner's argument
that Maine had consented to state law-based claims similar to the FLSA claims
because there was no allegation that Maine had systematically manipulated its
immunity to discriminate against federal claims. See id.
228. See discussion supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
229. See cases cited supra notes 78-80.
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for example, in Pennsylvania,2' Texas,2 1 Georgia, 2  and
Wisconsin.23 In other states like Ohio, state courts, prior to
Alden, had construed state legislation waiving sovereign
immunity for state law-based claims as including waiver to be
sued in state court on federal claims, but only because of an
erroneous understanding that state courts were constitutionally
required to hear such cases.' Precedent built on such an
230. In Pennsylvania, the legislature reaffirmed state sovereign immunity in
1978. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (1995). Under that statute, "immunity [is] the
rule, and the waivers [are] the exceptions." James J. Dodd & Martin A. Toth, The
Emperor's New Clothes: A Survey of Significant Court Decisions Interpreting
Pennsylvania's Sovereign Immunity Act and Its Waivers, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 106-07
(1993). In Pennsylvania, waivers are "strictly construe[d] ... as the exceptions to
the general rule' and none set forth in the statute includes damage claims based
on federal law. Id. at 108. Waivers are limited to the following categories:
operation of a motor vehicle; claims for medical professional liability; claims
arising out of the care, custody or control of personal property or a dangerous
condition of real estate; claims for potholes and other dangerous conditions
created by natural elements; claims for the care, custody or control of animals;
claims for liquor store sales; claims for acts of Pennsylvania's military forces; and
claims for toxoids and vaccines. See id. at 106-07.
231. See John T. Montford & Will G. Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest for
a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, Part Two, 25 HOUS. L. REV.
245 (1988).
232. See Shea Sullivan, City of Rome v. Jordan: Georgia Is a Public Duty Doctrine
Jurisdiction with No Waiver of Sovereign Immunity-a Good "Call" by the Supreme
Court, 45 MERCER L. REv. 533, 542 n.30 (1993) (discussing an "amendment to the
Georgia constitution removing the waiver of sovereign immunity except as per a
Georgia Tort Claims Act"). Even when states waive sovereign immunity, its
"functional equivalent" often is reintroduced judicially through "the public duty
doctrine." Kelly M. Tullier, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure to Detain
Drunk Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 903 (1992). Under this doctrine, "gain[ ing]
popularity in more and more jurisdictions," Sullivan, supra at 538, government's
duties are public. Hence, no liability attaches for nonfeasance absent (1) explicit
assurance that government would act on behalf of an injured party, (2) knowledge
by government that inaction could lead to harm, or (3) justifiable detrimental
reliance by the injured party on government's affirmative undertaking. See id. at
540.
233. See, e.g., Mueller v. Thompson, 133 F.3d 1063, 1064 (7th Cir. 1998)
(construing Wisconsin statute authorizing overtime suits "in any court of
competent jurisdiction" as waiver of sovereign immunity only with respect to
state overtime laws, not the FLSA (citing WIS. STAT. §§ 109.01(2), (3), 109.03 (5)
(1999))).
234. For example, in Ohio, the state supreme court in Mossman v. Donahey, 346
N.E.2d 305 (1976), dismissed a FLSA claim against the state because the state had
not consented to such suit. See id. at 315. In Keller v. Dailey, 706 N.E.2d 28 (1997),
an intermediate Ohio court of appeals nevertheless construed the 1975 Ohio Court
of Claims Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.02(A)(1), 4111.01(C), 4111.03,
4111.10(A) (1999), as waiving sovereign immunity for FLSA suits brought against
the state in state court, even though nothing in that legislation explicitly refers to
consent to be sued on federal claims. See Keller, 706 N.E.2d at 30. The court in
Keller did this to avoid a conflict with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
had held that "'state employees may sue in state court for money damages under
the FLSA, and a state court would be obligated by the Supremacy Clause to
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erroneous legal foundation likely will be reconsidered in light
of Alden. Until such a complete evaluation has been
undertaken, it is premature to conclude that "[t]he rigors of
sovereign immunity are thus 'mitigated by a sense of justice
which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the
sovereign.'" 5 If anything, the evidence to date contradicts that
conclusion.
To some degree, the Court may have considered it unlikely
that many states will subject themselves to private damage
actions on federal claims. The Alden Court emphasized its
reliance on the states' voluntary compliance rather than on suit
in state court to remedy noncompliance. The majority was
"unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The
good faith of the States ... provides an important assurance
that [the demands of the Supremacy Clause will be
satisfied]." 26 Although a system in which states are expected to
exercise good faith and obey federal law is a worthy aspiration,
law libraries are filled with enough examples of noncompliance
with federal law to suggest the folly of excessive reliance on a
constitutional honor system and to recommend creation of
compliance incentives.27
B. Suits Against "Lesser Entities"
The Court advanced a persuasive claim when it argued that
the Trilogy's adverse effects on plaintiffs are mitigated by the
rule that state sovereign immunity applies only to the state,
state agencies, and entities considered arms of the state. State
sovereign immunity does not extend to a state's political
enforce federal law."' Keller, 706 N.E.2d at 30 (quoting Wilson-Jones v. Caviness,
99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996)).
235. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47,53 (1944)).
236. Id. at 2266.
237. Congress may create an incentive for "voluntary" consent by explicitly
conditioning receipt of federal funds on states' consent to suit in federal court to
litigate alleged violations of the federal statute providing the funding. See, e.g.,
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 184 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that states
accepting funds under Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments waive their
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court for Title IX violations);
Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1999) (same applied to
the acceptance of funds under the IDEA). But see Bradley, 189 F.3d at 755 (noting
that Congress lacks authority under its spending power to condition § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act funding unrelated to state waiver of sovereign immunity to all
claims under § 504).
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subdivisions-local governing bodies such as municipal
corporations,23 counties23 9 cities,240 and school districts.241 The
continuing ability to bring federal damage claims against these
units of local government is significant because it is here that
citizens interact with government most and thus here that the
greatest danger of infringement of federal rights exists.24
Nonetheless, the value of the distinction between the state
and its political subdivisions must be discounted for several
reasons. First, while the law is clear that a statewide agency of
state government is an arm of the state,243 the law is unclear,
and inconsistent, with respect to the status of state boards,
corporations, and similar groups. The problem has been
described as follows:
Courts classify state bodies according to a dichotomy,
labelling [sic] the entities as either arms of the state or as
political subdivisions .... Between arms of the state and
local municipalities, however, lies a wide range of
unconventional government-chartered entities that possess
attributes of both political subdivisions and state agencies.
These hybrid state entities create a vexing problem for
Article I courts faced with Eleventh Amendment immunity
disputes. Even the more traditional state-created bodies,
such as public universities, school districts, and highway
and transit agencies, cannot always be placed squarely in the
alter ego-political subdivision dichotomy.
244
Confusion arises because the arm-of-the-state doctrine lacks
238. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267; see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376
(1990) (holding that "municipal corporations and similar governmental entities
are [§ 1983] 'persons").
239. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal suit to collect debt against a county).
240. See Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552,563-66 (1900).
241. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,123 n.34 (1984)
("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not apply to 'counties and similar municipal
corporations."' (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274,280 (1977))).
242. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICrION 406 (1999) ("The ability to
sue local governments in federal court is significant because it is this level of
government that provides most social services in this country ... [and is] most
likely to violate [federal law].").
243. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (citing Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945)).
244. Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity:
Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1243,1243 (1992).
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coherent standards,24 produces contradictory results,246 and is
unsupportable based on functional differences between a state
and its political subdivisions.247 Overall, the arm-of-the-
state/political subdivision distinction has generated
considerable criticism.248
Second, the Court has recognized an important, but as yet
not fully developed, exception to the rule. Even when it is
undisputed that a governing entity is not entitled to state
sovereign immunity on its own, the Court will accord
immunity when the relief granted would harm the state
directly.24 9 The crucial factors are the level of state cooperation
between state and local officials anticipated by state law and
whether the source of funding comes exclusively or primarily
from the state.
20
245. See id. at 1243-44. Rogers argues:
The incoherence that plagues the arm-of-the-state doctrine stems from the
Court's failure to articulate a principled analytical framework in which to
gauge a state governmental body's Eleventh Amendment immunity status....
[Tjhe Court's approach has unleashed the lower courts to craft their own
dissimilar, multi-factor tests, which often extend beyond the methodology
undertaken by the Supreme Court, vary on the relative weight of each factor,
and generate conflicting results.
Id.; see also JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (1987)
("[Tihe distinction in Eleventh Amendment law between cities and counties on
the one hand and states on the other produces bizarre results.").
246. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 242, at 407-08; 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531.11 (3d ed. 1998).
247. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1057 (4th ed.
1996) ("Since a local government is a creature of the state, it is hard to see any
functional basis for distinguishing the two.").
248. See ORTH, supra note 245, at 119; Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 756 (1978) (concluding that the distinction is
anomalous); see also Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh
Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 57 n.23 (1990) (noting that the
distinction is seen as a "doctrinal anomaly"). A parallel issue arises with respect to
multi-state agencies created pursuant to a congressionally approved interstate
compact. In Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979), the intent of the states entering into the interstate compact seemed to be
determinative of whether the states' sovereign immunity was found to run to the
multi-state agency. In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 51
(1994), the Court emphasized the absence of state financial responsibility in
holding that a multi-state agency was not entitled to sovereign immunity. It is
unclear how much financial responsibility of the creating states is sufficient to
entitle the multi-state agency to sovereign immunity.
249. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124 n.34
(1984).
250. See Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412,417-18 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[The most crucial
factor to be considered in determining the County's status is 'whether the funds to
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McMillon v. Monroe Count "5' further complicates the problem.
In McMillon, a county sheriff, locally elected and compensated
from local funds, was found to be a state official primarily
because he enforced state law. Many local officials enforce state
law and, for that reason, can be expected to claim the status of
state officials. Until principled limits are placed on McMillon, it
threatens to consume the arm-of-the-state/political subdivision
distinction.
In sum, while the Court in Alden is correct that the
distinction between a state and its political subdivisions
ameliorates the impact of the Trilogy on plaintiffs, the
distinction's soft boundaries invite manipulation. With so
much now riding on whether a governing entity is
characterized as an arm of the state or a local political
subdivision-and, if a local political subdivision, whether any
exceptions apply-one can expect public officials will exert
considerable energy to move the law in the direction of more
immunity for local governing units and local officials being
sued in their official capacity.252 A cautious response to the
Court's "lesser entities" observation is warranted.
C. Suits Brought by the Federal Government
Over a quarter-century ago, at a time when a majority of
state and local employees were not covered by the FLSA, the
Solicitor General of the United States argued in an amicus brief
in Employees v. Missouri Public Health Department 3 that the
United States Department of Labor could investigate less than
defray any award would be derived from the state treasury."' (quoting Laje v. R.E.
Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1982))); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at
123-24.
251. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
252. The stakes are particularly high in litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Will
v. Michigan Dep t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Court held that neither
states nor officials sued in their official capacities for damages are "persons"
within the meaning of § 1983. This is because § 1983 was interpreted as paralleling
the scope of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at
66-67. For a discussion of the sovereign immunity protections accorded state
officers sued in their official capacity, see infra notes 273-305 and accompanying
text. Government entities that do not enjoy sovereign immunity, such as
municipalities and other local government units, are "persons" under § 1983. See
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Accordingly, resolution
of the arm-of-the-state versus local political subdivision distinction determines
whether a § 1983 action can be brought against a unit of government and its
officials sued in their official capacity for damages.
253. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
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four percent of the employing establishments.z51 In 1974,
Congress similarly determined, based on the Department of
Labor's experience enforcing the FLSA, "that the enforcement
capability of the Secretary of Labor is not alone sufficient to
provide redress in all or even a substantial portion of the
situations where compliance is not forthcoming voluntarily." 25'
The problem was compounded, Congress concluded, by the
inclusion in 1974 of additional state government employees,
making it "all the more necessary that employees in this
category be empowered themselves to pursue vindication of
their rights. " 256 InAlden, the Solicitor General advised the Court
that "[w]e have been informed by the Department of Labor that
its more recent experience confirms Congress's judgment that
private enforcement is necessary to ensure that state employees
receive the wages to which they are entitled by federal law."
257
Notwithstanding this evidence, the Alden Court included
government enforcement of federal rights as one of the "ample
[alternative] means to correct ongoing violations of law and to
vindicate the interests which animate the Supremacy
254. See id. at 287; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Police
Organizations in Support of Petitioners at 29, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999) (No. 98-436) ("Any assertions that the Department of Labor could take over
the responsibility for bringing all of these [wage and hour] lawsuits against States,
which are or would be brought by affected public employees, strain credibility
and are completely unfounded, due to serious resource constraints.").
255. S. REP. No. 93-690, at 27 (1974).
256. Id.
257. Brief for United States at 37, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (No. 98-
436). Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that especially with respect to "a
right so integral to personal autonomy and well-being as the recovery of wages
due under federal law in exchange for one's own labor," an individual should not
be left to the vicissitudes of federal officials "who must operate under their own
enforcement priorities and resource limitations." Id. at 38.
After careful study, Professor Clyde Summers concluded that "[e]nforcement
[of the FLSA] through the Department of Labor has marked weaknesses.... [T]he
agency is woefully lacking in the necessary resources.... Inadequate settlements
are accepted because of the costs of collecting adequate proof, pursuing litigation,
and updating investigations prior to finalizing settlement agreements.' Summers,
supra note 217, at 492-93 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "[w]hen the
Secretary brings suit it is almost always for an injunction, which allows recovery
of wages but does not allow liquidated damages. This is to avoid the cost and
delay of a jury trial, which is required to recover liquidated damages." Id. at 494
(citation omitted). Professor Summers concluded that government enforcement
did not deter violators: "Because there are too few compliance officers, a violator
only has one chance in five of getting caught." Id. at 494-95; see also Stephen G.
Wood & Mary Anne Q. Wood, The Fair Labor Standards Act: Recommendations to
Ieprove Compliance, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 529, 546-48 (describing the FLSA
enforcement procedures).
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Clause." 8
The dissent in Alden characterized this view as whimsical. 9
The government enforcement model is unrealistic, as the
dissent in Alden suggests, both because of the absence of
resources260 and the absence of political will.261 With 4.7 million
employees employed by the fifty states, it is difficult to
disagree with the dissent's conclusion that "there is no reason
today to suspect that enforcement by the Secretary of Labor
alone would likely prove adequate to assure compliance with
[the FLSA]."262
258. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
259. See id. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Ulniess Congress plans a significant
expansion of the National Government s litigating forces to provide a lawyer
whenever private litigation is barred by today's decision and Seminole Tribe, the
allusion to enforcement of private rights by the National Government is probably
not much more than whimsy.").
260. See Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting the
conclusion by the Secretary of Labor, participating as amicus curiae, that the
Department of Labor's lack of adequate resources means that "individual suits
offer the only realistic hope of protecting employees from retaliatory
discrimination'). In his examination of federal enforcement of federal labor laws,
Professor Clyde Summers discovered a pattern of inadequate enforcement due
largely to inadequate funding. See Summers, supra note 217, at 480-81. This was
true of the FLSA as well as other federal statutes. He found that in 1989 the federal
government filed only 563 suits for employment discrimination, whereas private
litigants brought 7,470 suits. See id. at 480. He also found that "[p]rocessing cases
through the EEOC is painfully slow. On the average, 280 days are required to
investigate a case and make a determination as to reasonable cause and 255 days
are consumed in conciliation efforts to obtain voluntary compliance and
settlement." Id. at 480-81. He noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) "brought suit in less than 30 percent of the cases in which
reasonable cause was found and conciliation failed." Id. at 481. Professor Summers
concluded that "[t]he inadequacy of enforcement through the EEOC is, in large
measure, the result of inadequate funds to handle the caseloads, which limits the
EEOC's efforts and causes delays." Id.
261. See NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
157 (1988) ("The record [of the Reagan Administration] clearly manifests an effort
to turn back the clock in the enforcement of civil rights laws [and] not merely in
comparison with prior administrations.... [T]here was 'cyclical movement in the
path' ... notably in the Nixon years."); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION vii-viii (1993) ("[M]uch of the progress that OSHA
made during its first decade was dissipated during the first five years of the
Reagan administration. The president's appointment of administrators who were
extremely hostile to the agency's mission during this period rendered OSHA
impotent."); see also BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY xii-
xiii (1984) (discussing the mixed enforcement record of OSHA under various
Assistant Secretaries of Labor).
262. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting). One reader argued this
point in stronger terms:
"Mindless" is an apt description [of Alden]. The ruling puts aggrieved
state workers in an impossible bind .... [The case] leaves the federal
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
The lack of realism of government enforcement as an
alternative to private damage actions is exceeded only by its
irony. The efficacy of the Court's argument depends on the
federal government vastly expanding its enforcement capacity
with respect to dozens of federal laws that likely will fall
within the rule of Alden. The image of a bulging and expensive
federal bureaucracy of government attorneys descending on
state agencies to enforce federal law is hardly the federalism of
Justices Black or Powell or, one would have thought, Justices
Rehnquist, Kennedy, or Scalia.26 Moreover, an effective federal
enforcement effort that substantially duplicates the pre-
Seminole Tribe/Alden private effort does little to alleviate the
states' autonomy and fiscal apprehensions, which so manifestly
inform the Court's reasoning in Alden.264 Except for the political
filter the Court referenced in Alden,26  substituting a
government lawyer for a private one does nothing to address
the Alden majority's many structural concerns. This irony
disappears only if one concludes that it is unrealistic to expect
the federal government to mount, if it ever could, a sufficiently
effective enforcement effort to compensate for the loss of
private enforcement caused by Alden and Seminole Tribe.266
oVernment to sue on a state worker's behalf, which is an option that's
lng on theory but almost nonexistent in fact. There are almost 4.7 million
state workers, and it's clear that enforcement agencies such as the Labor
Department can't begin to handle the volume of current and future
complaints.
Editorial, supra note 17.
263. See Editorial, Federalism Under Attack, THE BUFFALO NEWS, June 28,1999, at
B2. The editorial argues that the Trilogy
shifts more of the monitoring of state compliance with federal law from
individuals-who would be much closer to any problem-to the national
government, which lacks the manpower to effectively monitor the alleged
violations. This decision will expand personal dependence on government.
That, along with weakening personal rights, is a curious pathway for
conservatives on the Supreme Court to take.
Id.
264. See discussion supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text; see also Hess v.
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (" [T]he vulnerability of the
State's purse [is] the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations.").
265. See discussion supra note 131 and accompanying text.
266. See Editorial, States and the Court, WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at A18 ("[TIhe
court's continued expansion of this area is a perverse kind of federalism that
doesn't actually augment state policymaking authority except to the extent that
states wish to violate federal law.").
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D. Suits Against State Officers
After Seminole Tribe, three important articles argued that the
case was more rhetorical than real. In one, Henry Monaghan
maintained that "although Seminole Tribe inflates the rhetoric of
'inherent state sovereignty,' the majority in fact left firmly in
place the fundamental reality of state accountability in federal
court for violation of federal law."267 John Jeffries expressed a
similar view when he stated,
The Eleventh Amendment almost never matters. More
precisely, it matters in ways more indirect and attenuated
than is usually acknowledged .... If it were not possible to
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment through Section 1983,
the Supreme Court would long ago have confined the
Eleventh Amendment to diversity cases or adopted some
other debilitating construction.
268
Carlos Manuel V.zquez concurs, somewhat more
cautiously, observing that
[m]uch of the revisionist scholarship on the Eleventh
Amendment appears to have been driven by profound
discomfort with th[e] enforcement gap created by the Hans
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment .... [H]owever, I
am satisfied that the 'fictions' that the Court has used to
alleviate the problems created by Hans reduce the gap to
manageable proportions .... 269
These authors find comfort in the opportunities still available
to sue state officers in federal court.27 The Court in Alden also
listed these opportunities as meaningful alternatives to private
damage actions against the state.2n
The option to sue state officers operates at two levels -suits
against officers in their official capacities and suits against
267. Monaghan, supra note 117, at 103.
268. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 49, 59.
269. Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1695.
270. See Monaghan, supra note 117, at 103 ("[L]ittle has changed after the
Seminole Tribe decision because the rule of Ex parte Young remains in full force.");
Jeffries, supra note 49, at 49 ("In almost every case where action against a state is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, suit against a state officer is permitted under
Section 1983."); Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1790 ("I conclude that as long as the
Constitution continues to be interpreted to authorize private suits against state
officers who violate federal law, an interpretation of the Constitution as barring
pnvate damage actions against the states themselves does not raise severe rule-of-
law problems.").
271. See discussion supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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officers in their individual capacities." As shown in the next
two sections, official capacity suits are inadequate because they
neither compensate nor deter, and may soon become history-
at least as we have understood them. Individual capacity suits
also are inadequate substitutes because they are unavailable
when the federal right of action is against the state itself rather
than the individual state officer, as is often the case. Moreover,
even when statutes create a right of action against state officers
individually, qualified immunity too often presents an
insurmountable hurdle.
1. Official Capacity Suits for Prospective Relief
One of the "fictions" in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
is the rule permitting federal court suits against state officers in
their official capacity. Referred to as Young actions after the lead
case establishing the rule, 2 such suits name the state officer as
the nominal party. But, because the suit is against the office, not
the officer, the state is the real party in interest.274 Federal
courts have jurisdiction over an official capacity suit against a
state official "when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive
relief in order to 'end a continuing violation of federal law.'
275
These suits may not be maintained for retroactive relief,
however, thus precluding suits for damages.276 Thus, official
272. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (elaborating on "the distinction
between personal- and official-capacity suits").
273. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
274. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 ("Suits against state officials in their official
capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State." (citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159,166 (1985))).
275. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). Such suits remain suits against the state for
purposes of the state action doctrine but not for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment. This is why the rule has been referred to by the Court as a "fiction."
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,114 n.25 (1984).
276. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("[A] suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."). In Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89, the
Young rule was held also not to apply to prospective relief based on state law. That
outcome is the application of the broader principle that "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment forecloses... the application of normal principles of ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction where claims are pressed against the State." County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 251 (1985). Indeed, even when a
federal court has jurisdiction to hear a private damage claim against the state
based on federal law because Congress has validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity through its Section 5 power, the courts routinely will dismiss state
causes of action based on this reasoning in Pennhurst. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd.
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capacity suits relax the grip of Seminole Tribe, Boerne, and the
Trilogy to some degree. For example, under current doctrine, a
patent or copyright holder presumably could use this "fiction"
to sue in federal court to enjoin continuing infringement of a
patent or copyright.7 The injunction would operate
prospectively from the date of the court's order.
Nonetheless, several limitations discount the value of this as
an adequate alternative to a judicially enforced damage claim
against the state itself. First, some federal statutes provide for
the federal government, but not private parties, to seek
injunctive relief to enforce federal rights. The FLSA is a good
example. It creates a private right of action to recover "unpaid
minimum wages, or... unpaid overtime compensation"278 but,
as the Supreme Court is fully aware, only the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to sue to enjoin the continuing violation of
an employee's statutory right to a minimum wage or overtime
compensation.279
Second, while this alternative may end ongoing violations of
federal law, it does not grant compensation for past wrongs
and does not deter noncompliance by the states until injunctive
relief is granted."0 The Court acknowledges that the Young
fiction is designed to vindicate the supremacy of federal law
values in our Constitution but not deterrence or compensation
values.' The significance one attaches to this limitation varies
of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 n.17 (11th Cir. 1998)), aff'd on other grounds, 120 S.
Ct. 631 (2000) (involving an ADA action).
277. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that, even if copyright damage claims cannot be brought against a state
in federal court because Congress lacks Section 5 authority to enact the copyright
laws, "[t]he Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits for prospective injunctive relief
278. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994).
279. FLSA § 217 provides for injunctive relief. See id. § 217. FLSA § 211(a) states
the following- "[Tlhe Administrator shall bring all actions under section 217 of
this title to restrain violations of this chapter." Id. § 211(a). Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has stated that "in construing the enforcement sections of the
FLSA, the courts ha[ve] consistently declared that injunctive relief [1]s not
available in suits by private individuals but only in suits by the Secretary."
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,581 (1978); see also Summers, supra note 217, at 491
(noting that employees can sue for back wages and liquidated damages but only
the Secretary of Labor can sue for injunctive relief under § 217).
280. A noncomplying state risks a damage suit by the federal government, but
that risk may be slight. See discussion supra notes 253-66 and accompanying text.
281. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("Remedies designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest
in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests
are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment." (citations
No. 2]
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with one's view of what the rule of law principle should
encompass. Even a modest view certainly would insist that
there be meaningful deterrence and some compensation for
past violations. 282 Young remedies provide neither.
In any event, the Court seems likely to curtail the Young
remedy in the near future. In Seminole Tribe, the Court denied a
Young remedy' against the Governor of Florida to compel
compliance with the duty to negotiate required by the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).2 The Court concluded that
the availability of the Young remedy depended on Congress's
intent to provide it and found a lack of intent in IGRA because
the statute contained an "intricate remedial scheme."2 5 The
Court easily could extend this intent requirement to limit Young
remedies to those statutes containing a clear statement by
Congress of an intent to provide them.26 Such a clear statement
limitation could substantially reduce the availability of Young
remedies. 8 7 But even under the best possible interpretation,
omitted)).
282. Carlos Manuel Vizquez, for example, advances the view that "[t]he rule-
of-law ideal insists that federal courts have the power not just to stop ongoing
violations of federal law, but also to remedy at least the most egregious past
violations as well." Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1686 (emphasis omitted). The Court
seems to acknowledge that official capacity suits are a necessary but not sufficient
alternative to damage suits against the states. In Alden, the Court added damage
suits against state officers in their individual capacities to the list of remedial
options that, together, comprise an "ample" alternative to damage suits against
the state. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267-68; see also discussion infra notes 306-97 and
accompanying text.
283. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 n.17 ("We find only that Congress
did not intend [to authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young] in the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.").
284. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994). The duty to
negotiate is set forth in IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
285. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-74 ("[T]he duty to negotiate imposed upon
the State by [the IGRA] does not stand alone. Rather ...Congress passed
§ 2710(d)(3) in conjunction with the carefully crafted and intricate remedial
scheme set forth in § 2710(d)(7). Where Congress has created a remedial scheme
for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal
officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary."
(citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,423 (1988)).
286. See Jackson, supra note 36, at 530 ("Seminole Tribe's treatment of Ex parle
Young can be understood as part of a broader effort by the Court to limit the
availability of federal judicial relief on a range of statutory and constitutional
claims, absent explicit congressional authorization.").
287. Vicki Jackson has found in Seminole Tribe an even more ominous
possibility. Focusing on language in the case describing Young as a "narrow
exception to the Eleventh Amendment," Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76, Jackson
concludes that the remedy may be limited in the future to constitutional, not
statutory, violations. See Jackson, supra note 36, at 535 ("[T]he most troubling
implication of Seminole Tribe is its recasting of Exparle Young as an almost doubtful
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"[t]he test will be .. .: Does the statutory scheme evince a
congressional design to preclude the [Young] remedy... ? [The
answer] turns on analysis of the terms, history, purpose, and
context of the remedial provisions of the particular statute
sought to be enforced." 8 Seminole Tribe makes plain that a
plaintiff no longer can rely confidently on the availability of
prospective relief to enforce federal rights in federal court by
suing state officers in their official capacity.
One might be more inclined to discount Seminole Tribe's
likely narrowing of the Young remedy if it were not for the
decision the following year in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe.289 In
that case, a Native American Indian tribe sought to enjoin the
state from interfering with its asserted beneficial ownership of
the submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene. Holding the
Young exception inappropriate, the Court dismissed the claim
as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. To some
commentators, the case stands for the relatively benign
proposition that the Young remedy is unavailable "to quiet title
to submerged lands."290 Yet the reasoning in Justice Kennedy's
principal opinion invites a much broader understanding. In
Coeur d'Alene, the majority examined the effect of the tribe's
requested relief on the state's treasury and governing
autonomy, concluding that the case implicated "particular and
special circumstances." 291 A victory by the tribe, the Court
reasoned, would affect the state's "sovereign interest in its
lands and waters... [as extensively] as almost any conceivable
retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury"2 92 and would affect
the state's control "over a vast reach of lands and waters."
293
Coeur d'Alene thus suggests that the availability of the Young
remedy may be limited to injunctions that have a minimal
impact on a state's treasury or governing autonomy. This
act of judicial usurpation, justified only in 'narrow' circumstances (possibly those
involving constitutional violations not the subject of statutory remedies).'); see
also id. at 535 n.155.
288. David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
547,550 (1997).
289. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
290. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 242, at 429. In Coeur dAlene, the Court
analogized the suit for injunctive relief to a suit to quiet title. See Coeur d'Alene, 521
U.S. at 281.
291. 521 U.S. at 287.
29Z Id.
293. Id. at 282.
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exception threatens to consume much of the rule.
The Kennedy opinion in Coeur d'Alene proposed an even
more radical revision of the Young doctrine. In a section in
which only Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred, the opinion
argued for an ad hoc "balancing and accommodation of state
interests when determining whether the Young exception
applies in a given case."294 Expressing concern over a possible
"expansive application of the Young exception,"2 9 these Justices
proposed restricting its availability to cases in which "no state
forum [is] available to vindicate federal interests"296 or when a
case presents an otherwise compelling need to vindicate federal
rights.
297
The Alden decision is likely to generate renewed interest in
limiting Young in general and reconsidering adoption of the
Kennedy/Rehnquist approach to Young in particular. Alden
creates increased incentives for plaintiffs to seek Young
injunctions because such suits against state officers in their
official capacity are the only remaining judicial remedy
available to private plaintiffs seeking to enforce federal
statutory rights against a state. From the perspective of states'
rights advocates, unless Young is confined, states could be
denied the blessings of the Court's last half-decade of
federalism decisions. A quick review of the Alden majority's
structural arguments demonstrates the point.
Recall that in Alden the Court addressed several structural
themes.298 The first theme was autonomy. The Court stated that
"[a] state is entitled to order the processes of its own
governance .... ,,99 The second theme was fiscal stability. In
this regard, the Court stated that "an unlimited congressional
power to authorize suits in state court to levy upon the
treasuries of the States . . . could create staggering burdens,
giving Congress a power and a leverage over the States that...
would pose a severe and notorious danger to the States and
their resources." 00  And the third theme was the
294. Id. at 278.
295. Id. at 274.
296. Id. at 291.
297. See id. at 278.
298. See discussion supra notesl17-31 and accompanying text.
299. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2265 (1999).
300. Id. at 2264.
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"'unanticipated intervention [of individuals] in the processes of
government."' 30' Democratic governance requires that
judgments regarding the allocation of scarce resources be made
through each state's political process, "not by judicial decree
mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the
private citizen."0 2 Admittedly, these structural values no
longer can be threatened through private damage actions
against unconsenting states. But, unless and until Young is
contained, federal courts will continue to pose a threat to the
states' own ordering of its governmental processes and its fiscal
autonomy as a result of unanticipated litigation brought by
individual claimants.
Yet, eliminating the Young remedy altogether for statutory
claims is not likely to generate broad consensus. The remedy is
too important for assuring states' compliance with federal
statutory obligations, especially as Seminole Tribe and Alden
have eliminated the possibility of private damage relief against
the states. The likely increased reliance on the Young remedy
thus presents somewhat of a quandary. The
Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal to constrict Young could present
states' rights advocates with an elegant solution. It creates an
incentive for states to waive their sovereign immunity and
provide state court remedies to enforce federal rights-the
incentive being the offer to eliminate Young remedies for those
states providing adequate state remedies. If one assumes parity
of state and federal courts' capacity to enforce federal rights, as
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist assume,0 3 then
their proposal adequately protects federal rights while
removing one of the last sources of federal judicial oversight of
301. Id. (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,53 (1944)).
302. Id. at 2265. The Court warned that federal assertion of control "over a
State's most fundamental political processes ... strikes at the heart of political
accountability ...." Id.
303. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 274-75 (1997). The Court
said:
Neither in theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to have
federal claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity
would be applicable in federal court but for an exception based on Young. For
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is
brought in state or federal court.... Assuming the availability of a state forum
with the authority and procedures adequate for the effective vindication of
federal law, due process concerns would not be implicated by having state
tribunals resolve federal-question cases.
Id. But see supra note 68 for a discussion of the parity debate.
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the states still available to individual plaintiffs. Many might
find this to be an attractive combination. °4
The preceeding discussion strongly suggests that Seminole
Tribe and Coeur d'Alene represent the future jurisprudential
landscape in the sense that the Young exception as we have
known it will not likely continue.305 Because Seminole Tribe and
Alden expand the likelihood of Young injunctions becoming the
remedy of choice in federal litigation to enforce federal
statutory rights, states can be expected increasingly to voice
discontent. It would be a mistake, therefore, to dismiss the
Kennedy/Rehnquist proposal to restructure the Young remedy
simply because it attracted only two votes in Coeur d'Alene. The
vote count could swell as the incentive system built into the
Kennedy/Rehnquist approach becomes more appealing in
light of Alden. In any event, the adequacy of the Young remedy
as a substitute for a private damage action against the state
must be evaluated in light of the reality that the Young fiction
has been diluted, is under attack, and seems scheduled for a
major overhaul.
2. Individual Capacity Suits for Damages
Ann Woolhandler was a strong pre-Alden voice arguing that
state sovereign immunity prohibits federal damage actions in
state court against unconsenting states °.3 6 Her extensive
historical research reveals that "the Court historically did not
compel... unwilling state courts to provide [damage remedies
against the States]; the individual officer was a sufficient
target."" 7 Eleventh Amendment doctrine has incorporated this
tradition of redressing violations of federal law by permitting
304. College Savings Bank I already has deployed a variant of such an incentive
system. By holding that Congress lacks Section 5 power to provide a damage
remedy against the states for patent infringement when states already provide
adequate state remedies to redress infringement, the Court implied a contrary
result when the state "provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to
injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent. ... " College Say. BankI,
119 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1999).
305. In Coeur d'Alene, Justice O'Connor described the traditional understanding:
"When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal
rights, ordinarily the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar." Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S.
at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90
(1977).
306. See Woolhandler, supra note 71, at 148-54.
307. Id. at 152.
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damage actions against state officers sued in their individual
capacity.0 8 When state officers are sued in their individual
capacity (sometimes referred to as personal capacity suits), the
officer-and not the state-is the real party in interest.
Therefore, the suit is not against the state, although in virtually
every case the allegedly unlawful conduct arose when the
officer was acting in an official capacity. °9
Professor John Jeffries argues that "[i]n almost every case
where action against a state is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, suit against a state officer is permitted under
Section 1983."310 Therefore, "[t]he Eleventh Amendment almost
never matters."3 1 The argument is that "a suit against a state
officer is functionally a suit against the state, for the state
defends the action and pays any adverse judgment. So far as
can be assessed, this is true not occasionally and haphazardly
but pervasively and dependably."312  Such a strong
308. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) (finding that a state
governor may be sued for damages in federal court for conduct arising out of his
official conduct when the damages are to be paid by the governor himself); see
also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 395 (1971) (holding the same with respect to federal officials); cf. Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (holding a damage action
may not be maintained even though state officers are named defendants when
"the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state").
309. Personal capacity suits sometimes are denied erroneously because the state
official sued is found to have been incapable of causing the alleged harm except in
his or her official capacity, leading some courts to conclude that any liability
against the state officer must be in the officer's official capacity. See, e.g., Welch v.
Laney, 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a local sheriff was not an
"employer" under the FLSA when he acted in his individual capacity because the
sheriff had no control over the plaintiff's employment when acting in his
individual capacity); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding the
same with respect to the Family Medical Leave Act [hereinafter FMLA]). This
reasoning misreads the Eleventh Amendment. A similar argument was rejected in
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). There, a state official contended that she could
not be held liable under § 1983 in connection with the firing of some employees.
Because she had acted within the scope of her authority, any suit against her had
to be in her "official" capacity. See id. at 27-28. The Court disagreed, explaining
that this approach ignored congressional intent in enacting § 1983 to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of
authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 28 (internal citations omitted);
accord Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 415 (M.D. Pa. 1999) ("If
Congress had made the state actor subject to suit under a particular legislative
enactment, then that person may be sued in his or her 'individual capacity'
regardless of the fact thatthe alleged liability-creating conduct was part of the
defendant's 'official duties. This is the lesson of Hafer.").
310. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 49.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 50. Professor Jeffries reports that from personal experience he is
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endorsement of the efficacy of individual capacity damage
actions would seem to lend support to the Alden majority's
representation that these state officer suits are an adequate
substitute for damage actions against the state itself. A closer
reading of Jeffries's thesis, however, reveals a somewhat
different conclusion.
Jeffries' focus was constitutional, not statutory, violations.313
As to constitutional violations, the Eleventh Amendment may
never matter because § 1983 provides a right of action to sue
state officials for damages. Thus, it is accurate to conclude that
"[i]n the main, [the Eleventh Amendment] functions to force
civil rights plaintiffs to sue state officers rather than the states
themselves, thus triggering [a defense of] qualified
immunity. 314  Jeffries never claimed that the Eleventh
Amendment has no effect on statutory claims. As I show next,
much of the time just the opposite is true.
a. Many Federal Statutes Do Not Provide
a Right ofAction Against State Officers
The greatest difference between constitutional and statutory
damage claims against state officers is that federal statutes
routinely provide for entity suits against the state but do not
provide a right of action against state officers. This deficiency
cannot be cured by deploying § 1983 as a source for the right of
action. The Eighth Circuit decision in Alsbrook v. Maumelle15 is a
good case in point.
certain that state officers "can count on government defense and indemnification."
Id. In his lectures before state and local law enforcement officers, not once has an
officer responded "no" to his routine question of whether any knew from
personal experience "of any case where an officer sued under § 1983 was not
defended and indemnified by his or her agency." Id. at 50 n.16. State
indemnification does not convert an individual capacity suit against a state officer
back into a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) (finding that agreement by the
federal government to indemnify a state university did not deprive it of Eleventh
Amendment immunity); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 242, at 416 n.23, 423 n.48
(collecting cases); Jeffries, supra note 49, at 61 ("Whether a state chooses to
recognize a right to indemnification surely cannot control the availability of
federal remedies or the meaning of federal constitutional guarantees.").
313. See Jeffries, supra note 49, at 51 ("The ambition of this Article is to analyze
the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983 as an integrated package of liability
rules for constitutional violations."). Jeffries noted that "[flor statutory rights, the
role of the Eleventh Amendment is different." Id. at 51 n.19.
314. Id. at 59.
315. 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000), cert.
dismissed on application of both parties, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000).
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In Alsbrook, the plaintiff brought a federal court action
against the State of Arkansas, an Arkansas state agency, and
certain agency officials (called connissioners) in their official
and individual capacities. The plaintiff alleged violations of
Title II of the ADA and § 1983 and sought both injunctive relief
and damages resulting from defendants' refusal to certify him
as a police officer due to inadequate vision acuity.1 6 The court
granted summary judgment for all defendants on both the
ADA and the § 1983 claims.
The court dismissed the ADA claim against the state, the
state agency, and the commissioners in their official capacity. It
held that all defendants enjoyed state sovereign immunity from
these claims and Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the ADA to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.317 In addition, the court dismissed the
ADA-based damage claims against the state officers in their
individual capacities because Title II of the ADA provides
disabled individuals redress for discrimination by a "public
entity,"318 a term defined by the ADA to exclude individuals.3 9
Finally, the court held that the "ADA's comprehensive
316. See id. at 1002.
317. See id. at 1010. The Court held:
We find, therefore, that the extension of Title II of the ADA to the states was
not a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Consequently, there is no valid abrogation of Arkansas'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suit in federal court and the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim.
Id. This finding is contrary to the weight of authority. See id. at 1007 n.13. A Young
remedy might still have been available since that remedy does not depend on
Congress's abrogation authority. See discussion supra notes 269-73 and
accompanying text. A Young remedy was moot in Alsbrook, however, because the
plaintiff had received a waiver of his vision impairment and was certified as a
police officer, leaving only the damage remedy at issue. See Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at
1003 n.5.
318. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1005 n.8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994)).
319. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994)). The court relied on the Supreme
Court's admonishment in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
19 (1979), that "it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary
of reading others into it." This finding of no individual liability for state officers is
the standard view. See Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1005 n.8 ("[Wihile no circuit has
directly addressed the issue of individual liability under Title II, three have held
that there is no liability under Title I against individuals who do not otherwise
qualify as 'employers' under the statutory definition."); Butler v.. City of Prairie
Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009
(11th Cir. 1996) ("We hold that the [ADA] does not provide for individual
liability, only for employer liability."); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276,1280-82 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding same).
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remedial scheme bars [plaintiff's] section 1983 claims against
the commissioners in their individual capacities."320 While
§ 1983 actions are available to enforce both constitutional and
statutory rights,3 21 they are not available to enforce statutes
(such as the ADA) containing a comprehensive remedial
scheme as these schemes "evidence[] a congressional intent to
foreclose resort to section 1983 for remedy of statutory
violations."3 2 In sum, the court held that a plaintiff "cannot
bring a section 1983 claim against [state officers] in their
individual capacities when, as we have earlier concluded, he
could not do so directly under the ADA."3'
Federal statutory provisions for suit against state officials in
their individual capacities are erratic. The court's view of the
ADA in Alsbrook is the standard view.324 Many other statutes
are similarly interpreted. Examples include Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act,3 2 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 26 the Rehabilitation Act, 27 the FELA,328 the Jones
320. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1011. The court also held that "a section 1983 suit
cannot be brought against the State or [its agencies].... Nor can a section 1983
suit be asserted against the [state officials] in their individual capacities, because
such suit is no different from a suit against the state itself." Id. at 1010 (citations
omitted). The court noted that "[t]he exception to this rule is that a state official
may be sued in his or her official capacity for injunctive relief." Id. at 1010 n.19.
321. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
322. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1011 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981)). The court also stated that
"[c]ourts should presume that Congress intended that the enforcement
mechanism provided in the statute be exclusive." Id. Further, the Court found that
since "'Congress has provided [Title II] with detailed means of enforcement that it
imported from Title VII .... [We] think that Congress has, under the applicable
legal principles, rather clearly indicated an intention to make the remedies that
Title II itself gives the exclusive ones for the enforcement of that subchapter."' Id.
(quoting Pona v. Cecil Whittaker's, Inc., 155 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 1998))
(alterations in original).
323. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1011.
324. See discussion supra note 317.
325. See Huckabay v. Moore, 137 F.3d 871, 879 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[Tjhis circuit
will not consider § 1983 as a remedy for employment discrimination unless relief
under that section can be asserted on grounds different from those available
under title VII."); Huebschen v. Department of Health and Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d
1167,1170 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under section 1983
based upon Title VII against a person who could not be sued directly under Title
VII.").
326. See Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that state
officials acting in their individual capacities "cannot be held liable under the
ADEA or Title VII"); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir.
1994) ("[Tihe ADEA limits civil liability to the employer. .. ."); Campbell v. The
City Univ. Constr. Fund, No. 98 Civ. 5463, 1999 WL 435132, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June
25, 1999) ("Courts that allow concurrent § 1983 and ADEA or ADA claims, only
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Act,329 and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act.330 Courts find no private right of action against state
officers even though most of these statutes create a right of
action against the employer and its agents.33' As the court held
in Mason v. Stallings,32 "the 'agent' language was included to
ensure respondeat superior liability of the employer for the acts
of its agents," not to create individual liability against the
agents.33
Some federal statutes do provide for individual capacity
suits against state officers. Examples include the FLSAM and
allow the § 1983 claim where it is based on some substantive right other than a
violation of the actual ADEA or ADA statute.").
327. See Davis v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 104 F.3d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1997)
(expressing the view in dictum that "the comprehensive enforcement mechanisms
provided under § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and the ADA suggest Congress
did not intend violations of those statutes to be also cognizable under § 1983.").
328. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994). The FELA holds every railroad engaged in interstate
commerce liable in damages to any person suffering injury while employed by the
carrier. See id.; Connors v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 90-CV-464, 1993 WL
169646, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 19,1993) ("The FELA, by its very terms, applies only
to [common carriers].").
329. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994). The Jones Act reads in pertinent part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply ....
Id. § 688(a).
330. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901, 905(b) (1994). The term "employer" means
an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime
employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United
States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building
way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel.
Id. § 902(4). The term "employee" means "any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman,
shipbuilder, and shipbreaker ... ." Id. § 902(3).
331. See, e~g., Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The
definition of 'employer' in the Disabilities Act is like the definitions in Title VII of
the 1994 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) [(1994)], and in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)[(1994)]."); Campbell, 1999
WL 435132, at *2 ("The ADA defines an employer as: 'a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees... and any agent of
such person.' 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) [(1994)]. The definition of an employer under
the ADEA is the same except that it requires twenty or more employees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) [(1994)].").
332. 82 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1996).
333. Id. at 1009.
334. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). Several courts have held that, under certain
conditions, individual officers may be liable under the FLSA. See, e.g., Baystate
Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
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the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).335 Both cover
employing entities (including state governments) plus "any
person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer."336 In addition, the copyright laws provide a right of
action against state officials in their individual capacity.3 7 Suits
against individual officers are also provided by the
trademark338  and patent 39  laws. Moreover, some
that although supervisory authority is not alone sufficient for individual liabilityunder the FLSA, individual defendants are liable if they have control over thework situation coupled with personal responsibility for the decision that violatedthe FLSA); United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6thCir. 1995) (finding individual defendant liable under the FLSA where he hadpower over hiring, firing, rates of pay, schedule, and payroll); Dole v. Solid WasteServs., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 895, 923 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd mem., 897 F.2d 521 (3d Cir.1990) ("'The overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate officer withoperational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is an employer alongwith the corporation, jointly and severally liable under [the FLSA] for unpaiawages." (quoting Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509,1511 (1st Cir. 1983))).
335. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994). Several courts have established individualliability for state officers under the FMLA. See Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.Supp. 2d 403, 412 (M.D. Pa. 1999) ("[T]he majority of courts have looked to FLSAindividual liability case law and determined that individual liability exists underthe FMLA."); Bryant v. Delbar Prods., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (M.D. Tenn.1998) (noting that the majority of courts have determined that FMLA extendsindividual liability to those who control a plaintiff's ability to take a leave ofabsence); Stubl v. T.A. Sys., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1997)("Although reasonable arguments could be made that the policy rationaleunderlying the Title VII decisions finding no individual liability should dictate thesame result under the FMLA, the plain language of the statute and the regulations
mandate otherwise.").
336. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994); see also FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(1)(1994). Thus, the plain language of each manifests an intent to provide forindividual liability. See Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998)("This language clearly suggests that individuals are contemplated as defendants
under [the EMLA].").
337. The Copyright Act provides liability for "anyone" who participates in aninfringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417,433 (1984) ("'Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights ofthe copyright owner,' that is, anyone who trespasses into [the copyright owner's]exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in oneof the five ways set forth in the statute, 'is an infringer of the copyright."' (quoting17 U.S.C. § 501(a)). Accordingly, state officials are amenable to suit for copyrightviolations, irrespective of their employment by a state institution. See RichardAnderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114,122 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The mere factthat [a party's] conduct was undertaken in the course of ... state employmentdoes not of course relieve [the party] of individual liability, even if [the] employercould not be sued for it."); John M. DiJoseph, The One and the Many-TheExpropriation of Intellectual Property by the States, Copyright and the EleventhAmendment, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 1, 19 (1989) ("The Fourth Circuit's rationale inimposing liability on state officials for copyright infringement is conceptually
sound.").
338. See Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1994); MicrosoftCorp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (D. Md. 1995) ("A party who,with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materiallycontributes to the infringing conduct of another, will be held liable as a
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environmental statutes provide a right of action against both
entities and their officials. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) 340 is a prominent example.' 41 Some additional
environmental statutes adopt that model,2 but others do
contributory infringer and is jointly and severally liable for the infringement.").
This general rule is applicable both to trademark infringement and unfair trade
practices cases. See Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir.
1987); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1231 (D.
Utah 1997) ("Corporate officers can be held personally liable for trademark
infringement and unfair competition committed by the corporation 'if the officer
is a moving, active conscious force behind the [sic] infringement."' (quoting
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 899, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
339. See Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn.
1989); cf Cameco Industries, Inc. v. Louisiana Cane Mfg. Co., No. Civ. A. 92-3158,
1996 WL 17170, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 1996) ("Defendant does not dispute that
applicable patent law imposes individual liability on corporate officers for certain
actions taken by them on behalf of an infringing corporation." (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1994))).
340. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9662 (1994).
341. CERCLA defines person to include inter alia individuals and government
entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994). CERCLA thus provides a right of action
against state government. See Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F.
Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("Congess intended that state governmental entities be
liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable under CERCLA.").
CERCLA also provides a right of action against individuals. See United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998) (stating that for individual liability, one "must
manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is,
operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations."). George J. Weiner
& Lara Bernstein Mathews argue:
Assuming that the other elements of a claim are satisfied, CERCLA
imposes liability on several categories of 'responsible parties,' including
those persons who currently own or operate a facility where a hazardous
substance has been released into the environment, formerly owned or
operated a facility at the time a hazardous substance was disposed of,
and those who generated 'or otherwise arranged for' disposal or
treatment of a hazardous substance that has been released into the
environment. [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3) (1994).] The definition of 'person'
includes individuals, corporations, and partnerships.
George J. Weiner & Lara Bernstein Mathews, Parent Corporation and Individual
Liability Under CERCLA After Bestfoods 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 456, 460
(1999).
342. See Dean M. Cordiano & Deborah J. Blood, Individual Liability for
Environmental Law Violations 64 CONN. BJ. 214,214,218 (1990). They argue:
Such laws as the Clean Air Act, [42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7641 (1994),] the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, [33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994),] the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), [42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6987 (1994),] and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) [42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9662
(1994),] impose civil liability on "persons" and "owners and operators"
who violate their provisions .... There is now a significant body of
federal ... law interpreting the definition of "person" and "owner or
operator" under various statutes to include corporate officers.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
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In short, enforcing statutory damage claims against state
officers is a far cry from enforcing constitutional damage
claims. The Eleventh Amendment very much matters when
federal statutes do not create a right of action against state
officers, as is often the case, for then an individual plaintiff has
no forum to seek compensation for past violations of federal
rights. But even if the federal statute under which a plaintiff
sues does provide a damage remedy against a state official,
recovery very often becomes highly problematic because of yet
one more hurdle: the qualified immunity doctrine.
b. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine: A Formidable Barrier to
Recovery
State officials may invoke either absolute or qualified
immunity from personal liability for damages. The immunity
available depends on the official's functions. Judges in their
judicial functions,3 4  prosecutors in their prosecutorial
capacities,345 and legislators in their legislative functions 346 are
entitled to absolute immunity. Most other state officials may
assert qualified immunity.47
The modem standard for qualified immunity tests objective
reasonableness of a state officer's conduct: "[G]overnment
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Accordingly, even if a plaintiff proves a violation of
343. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1994), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1994) regulate the activities of state government
but do not provide any private right of action for damages, nor does § 1983 create
one. See Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
344. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,11 (1991) (per curiam).
345. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-96 (1991). Police officers serving as
witnesses and the President of the United States also possess absolute immunity
for official action. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 242, at 500, 510-12.
346. See Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
406 (1979).
347. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); CHEMERINSKY, supra note
242, at 513.
348. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982).
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federal law, immunity may still attach. The state officer must
show either that the violation made out by the plaintiff's case
was not clearly established at the time the officer engaged in
the challenged conduct, or that a reasonable officer confronting
the facts of the case at the time would not have understood that
the challenged conduct violated the plaintiff's clearly
established federal rights. 9
This qualified immunity doctrine severely burdens a
plaintiff's ability to secure compensation for violations of
federal rights. First, the immunity is not just immunity from
liability. Rather, it is an "entitlement not to stand trial or face
the other burdens of litigation.""' Accordingly, a denial of
immunity is immediately appealable.35' In fact, two
interlocutory appeals may be available to a state officer before
the merits of the case are ever addressed, one following a
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the ground of qualified
immunity and another when a motion for summary judgment
is denied.352 These interlocutory appeals to the court of appeals
substantially delay the litigation and increase its cost.
In addition, the qualified immunity doctrine may impose
heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs. In many
circuits, even though qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense, plaintiffs must plead facts showing that the federal
right invoked was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.5 3 Even in circuits rejecting a per se heightened
349. See Falkner v. Houston, 974 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D. Neb. 1997); see also
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). The Court in Lewis
stated:
The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified
immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a [federal] right at all. Normally, it is only then that a court
should ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established
at the time of the events in question.
Id.; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) ("Once a defendant pleads a
defense of qualified immunity,. . . 'the judge ... may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time
[of the alleged violation].'" (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
350. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
351. See id. at 526-27.
352. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,306-07 (1996).
353. See, e.g., GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th
Cir. 1998) ("[I]n cases involving qualified immunity, where we must determine
whether a defendant's actions violate a clearly established right .... we are
guided both by the regular 12(b)(6) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]
standard and by the heightened pleading requirement [that plaintiff allege with
No. 2]
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pleading obligation, the district court may retain the discretion
to require plaintiffs to plead facts at the summary judgment
stage sufficient to answer a qualified immunity defense.3 4 The
sting of such a heightened pleading requirement is aggravated
in those jurisdictions applying a rule that until the threshold
immunity question is resolved, there should be no discovery on
the merits of the claim. 5
By far, the greatest hurdle is litigating whether the right
asserted was clearly established at the time of its alleged
violation. The Supreme Court has not formulated clear rules to
determine what nature of precedents is necessary to constitute
a right as clearly established. The Court has stated that "in
[some] instances a general [federal] rule already identified in
some specificity the facts which make out its claim]."); Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126
F.3d 1288, 1292 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e are compelled under the doctrine of
stare decisis to continue to apply our heightened pleading standard in cases
concerning individual government officers."); Edgington v. Missouri Dep't of
Corrections, 52 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Complaints seeking damages
against government officials... are subject to a heightened standard of pleading.
.);White v. Town of Chapel Hill, 899 F. Supp. 1428,1436 (M.D.N.C. 1995) ("The
Fourth Circuit has held that the litigant who brings suit against public officials
bears the burden of clearly establishing the law allegedly violated.'. But see Black
v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72,75 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that because qualified immunity
is "an affirmative defense that the defendants have the burden of raising in their
answer and establishing at trial or on a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff,
in order to state a claim of [federal rights] violation, need not plead facts showing
the absence of such a defense.").
354. See, e.g., Brown v. Valmet-Appleton, 77 F.3d 860, 863 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996).
The court found:
there no longer exists a per se 'heightened' pleading requirement in
qualified immunity cases.... Rather, in such cases any requirement that a
plaintiff clarify the allegations set forth in his or her complaint arises
solely out of the district court's discretionary authority to order a reply to
defendant's proffer of a qualified immunity defense.
Id.
355. Any discovery allowed is limited to addressing the qualified immunity
claim. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 n.14 (1998) ("Discovery
involving public officials is indeed one of the evils that Harlow aimed to address,
but ...we have since recognized that limited discovery may sometimes be
necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity."); Hegarty v. Somerset County, 25 F.3d 17, 18 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("The immunity from suit includes protection from the burdens of
discovery. 'Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should
not be allowed."' (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))); Castro
v. United States, 34 F.3d 106,112 (2d Cir. 1994). The Castro court held:
Where the claimant's description of the events suggests that the
defendants' conduct was unreasonable, and the facts that the defendants
claim are dispositive are solely within the knowledge of the defendants
and their collaborators, summary judgment can rarely be granted without
allowing the plaintiff an opportunity for discovery as to the questions
bearing on the defendants' claims of immunity.
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the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the
specific conduct in question."' 6 However, seldom will a rule
from one case apply with "obvious clarity" to the facts of
another case.3 7  This problem is especially acute when
interpreting regulatory statutes, as courts tend to articulate
standards rather than precise rules, and outcomes tend to be
fact-specific, leaving the exact contours of the right ill-
defined.5 8
Often, federal statutes receive different interpretations in
various circuits. Some circuits use such a "conflict of views" to
conclude that a right is not clearly established. In other
courts, a right may be found to be clearly established
356. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
357. Sometimes the standard of clearly established is stated as a requirement
that "prior cases logically lead to the right asserted by Plaintiff." Mennone v.
Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 58 (D. Conn. 1995). This formulation is no more
determinate since such a logical linkage is seldom self-evident or
noncontroversial.
358. Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994), as interpreted by most
courts, does not provide a right of action against individual state officers. See
discussion supra note 319 and accompanying text. But even if Congress eliminated
that infirmity through statutory amendment, a plaintiff suing a state officer for
damages would confront almost insurmountable obstacles demonstrating that
asserted rights are clearly established because so much of the ADA is set forth as
general standards rather than concrete rules. For example, ADA § 102 limits
coverage to a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
ADA § 3(2) defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." Id,
§ 12102. ADA § 101(8) defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without a reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position," and explains
that "[flor the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential .... ." Id. § 12111(8). ADA
§ 101(9)(A) defines "reasonable accommodation" as, inter alia, "making existing
facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities . . . ." Id. § 12111(9)(A). ADA § 102(b)(5)(A) prohibits "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... unless [the employer] can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship ..... Id.
§ 12112(b)(5) (A). ADA § 101(10) defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth
in [the next subsection]. Id. § 12111(10). ADA § 103(b) permits an employer to
require that an employee not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of otherindividuals in the w rkplace. Id. § 12113(b). ADA § 101(3) defines "direct threat"
as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation." Id. § 12111(3). Other sections of the ADA permit
employer actions that may be detrimental to the interests of persons with
disabilities if "shown to be job-related . . . and . . . consistent with business
necessity." Id. § 12112(b)(6); see also id. § 12112(c)(4)(A).
359. Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[I]n light of the
presently existing conflict of views, it is plain that [defendants] did not violate
plaintiff s 'clearly established' rights....").
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notwithstanding a circuit split "as long as 'no gaping divide
has emerged in the jurisprudence such that defendants could
reasonably expect this circuit to rule' to the contrary."
360
In most jurisdictions, the right is not clearly established
unless it is clearly established either in the Supreme Court or
the circuit court of appeals hearing the case.361 Other circuit
courts of appeal take a broader view.362 While the tests for
qualified immunity are intended to be objective, in reality, the
availability of the defense (and concomitantly the availability of
redress for violation of federal statutory rights) can depend
largely on in which federal judicial circuit one litigates a claim.
It bears emphasis that the qualified immunity doctrine creates a
lack of uniformity because of disagreement among circuits
regarding whether a certain federal right exists and has been
violated in a given case. This is a normal risk in any litigation.
The qualified immunity doctrine creates additional
360. Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283,1292 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Biergu v. Reno,
59 F.3d 1445,1459 (3d Cir. 1995)).
361. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111,116-17 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd 526 U.S.
603 (1999) (There must be "clear law from the Supreme Court, this court, or the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.... [Rleliance on decisions from other circuits to
determine that a given proposition of law is clearly established is inappropriate as
a general matter .... "); Snyder v. Ringgold, No. 97-1358,1998 WL 13528, at *3 (4th
Cir. Jan. 15, 1998) ("The plaintiff's resort to . . . out-of-circuit cases merely
underscores the lack of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court law establishing the
right for which she contends."); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d
821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[N]either the Supreme Court nor any other court in this
circuit nor [any court in this state] ... had ever actually applied the test [upon
which plaintiffs rely] .... School officials cannot be required to construe general
legal formulations that have not once been applied to a specific set of facts by any
binding judicial authority."); Russell v. Selsky, 35 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1994) ("We
conclude that in the absence of Supreme Court or Second Circuit precedents
prescribing [the ight asserted by plaintiff], there is no such clearly established
right..); Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056,1069 (6th Cir. 1991) ([W]hen there is no
controlling precedent in the Six Circuit our court places little or no value on the
opinions of other circuits in determining whether a right is clearly established.").
362 See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1065 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A] violation of
clearly settled law may be found even where the Supreme Court and the circuit in
question have not specifically addressed the question."); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d
1445,1459 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he absence of a previous decision from our court on
the [legality] of the conduct at issue is not dispositive."); Medina v. City and
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Ordinarily, in order for
the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts
must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains."); Romero v. Kitsap
County, 931 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing that the court should look to
other circuits in the absence of binding precedent); Williamson v. City of Virginia
Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1262 (E.D. Va. 1992) (comparing the conflicting views
across circuits as to whether precedents from other jurisdictions can 'clearly
establish" a right for deciding qualified immunity questions).
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inconsistency because the right asserted may have been dearly
established in one circuit but not another when the federal right
was violated.
All of the above pales in comparison with what has been
described as the "chronic difficulty" of accurately defining the
right at issue.36 It has been argued that if the right is framed at
too great a level of generality, "[p]laintiffs would be able to
convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of
virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of
extremely abstract rights." 64Conversely, if the right is defined
too narrowly, "the defined right would rarely if ever be said to
have been previously established,"3" and defendants would be
able to "define away all potential claims."366 Thus, a court has
great latitude to insert its policy preferences by choosing the
level of generality and incorporation of fact required to satisfy
the clearly established standard.
Even absent disagreement over characterization of the right,
widely varying results also can arise depending on the factual
correspondence a court requires between previous cases and
the case at bar. In some jurisdictions the defense of qualified
immunity prevails unless pre-existing law can be said to "truly
compel" the conclusion that defendant violated plaintiff's
federal rights.36 Or as another court has stated the test, "a
public official must not simply violate plaintiff's rights; rather
the violation of plaintiff's rights must be so clear that no
reasonable public official could have believed that his actions
did not violate plaintiff's rights." 368 This approach is obviously
very defendant-oriented. A few jurisdictions deny the qualified
immunity defense if the defendant's conduct dearly
363. LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68,73 (2d Cir. 1998).
364. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). This overstates the risk
because a plaintiff always must prove the case on the merits, whether or not the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity is made available to defendant.
365. Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1998).
366. Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977,980 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 465 (5th CAr. 1994)
(There exist "hazards of framing the legal question at too great a level of
generality. [But] [t]he error can be made in the opposite direction-a search so
narrowed that legal nuance rises to uncertainty and ultimately confounds
common sense.").
367. Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452,460 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
368. Gomez v. Pellicone, 986 F. Supp. 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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undermines the objectives federal law is designed to
preserve.369 This approach favors plaintiffs. These different
approaches seem to reflect different attitudes regarding the
desirability of holding state officers personally liable.
Occasionally, a court will reveal its proclivity in this regard, as
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did in Alexander v.
University of North Florida,3 70 when the court stated that
"qualified immunity for government officials is the rule,
liability and trials for liability the exception."37' In that circuit,
qualified immunity, "the rule," can be overcome only by
precedent in that circuit "developed in such a concrete and
factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable
actors, in the defendant's place, that what he is doing violates
federal law."372 One would not expect many exceptions from
the general rule of officer immunity when a court applies such
369. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994). The court in Ayenl
held that even absent any
reported decision that expressly forbids searching agents from bringing
members of the press into a home to observe and report on their activities
*.. [tihe argument [that there is no clearly established rule prohibiting
such an act] lacks merit. It has long been established that the objectives of
the Fourth Amendment are to preserve the right of privacy [and
accordingly] law enforcement officers' invasion of the privacy of a home
must be grounded on either the express terms of a warrant or the implied
authority to take reasonable law enforcement actions related to the
execution of the warrant. [Defendant] exceeded well-established
principles when he brought into the [plaintiff's] home [members of the
press] who were neither authorized by the warrant to be there nor
serving any legitimate law enforcement purpose by being there.
Id. at 686.
However, the court in Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998), disgreed. That
court stated that even if the Fourth Amendment clearly prohibits officers from
bringing
third parties [into plaintiff's home] who were not expressly authorized by
the warrant and who were not assisting reasonable law enforcement
efforts[,] ... we could not conclude that it was clearly established that the
conduct [of bringing a reporter to observe and photograph the execution
of an arrest warrant] manifestly fell within the ambit of that rule [since]
[w]hen this incident took place in 1992, there was no clear law from the
Supreme Court, this court, or the Court of Appeals of Maryland
[prohibiting the conduct].
Id. at 115-16.
370. 39 F.3d 290 (11th Cir. 1994).
371. Id. at 291.
372. Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted) ("For qualified immunity to be surrendered,
pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or
raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable
government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the
circumstances.") (emphasis in original).
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an understanding of qualified immunity. 7
Diana Hassel has examined the qualified immunity doctrine
in detail. Her study of all federal court cases over a two year
period found that courts sustained the defense of qualified
immunity in 80 percent of the cases 4.3 7  Her conclusions
comport with those of others.3 75 Professor Hassel's study
observes that "[tlhe broad qualified immunity standard allows
for a determination concerning liability of the defendant that is
very flexible and almost completely subject to the policy beliefs
of the judge making the decision." 76 She concludes that it is the
"court's almost unfettered judgment [that] determines the
outcome of the application of the defense." 3'
Alden exacerbates the qualified immunity doctrine's burden
on plaintiffs by channeling all federal-law-based private
damage actions against states into suits against state officers.
Today, irrespective of the merits of a plaintiff's legal arguments
under applicable federal statutory standards, a court in most
cases is able to limit recovery to those plaintiffs it considers to
be truly worthy suing state officers that the court considers to
be truly blameworthy. If history is prologue, very few plaintiffs
suing state officers for damages based on federal rights will
meet this test.
373. The Supreme Court revealed a similar proclivity in Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224 (1991). The Court stated, "The qualified immunity standard 'gives ample
room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.'" Id. at 228 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335,343,341 (1986)).
374. See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV.
123,145 n.106 (1999).
375. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified Immunity: How
Conflating Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 68
(1997) ("[Qlualified immunity has pulled the door to the courthouse nearly shut,
leaving a crack so thin that only the most battered plaintiffs can still squeeze
through."); Alfredo Garcia, The Scope of Police Immunity from Civil Suit Under Title
42 Section 1983 and Bivens: A Realistic Appraisal, 11 WHITIER L. REV. 511, 534
(1989) ("[Ihe individual citizen who seeks redress for a... violation [of federal
law] faces a formidable obstacle[:] the doctrine of qualified immunity .. ..");
William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government
and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1143
1996) ("Since the 1980s, it has become very difficult for plaintiffs ... to win a
state officer damage] case."); see also Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in
Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PrIM. L. REV. 935, 982 (1989) ("If
clearly-established is narrowly defined .. .it becomes nearly impossible to
overcome qualified official immunity.").
376. Hassel, supra note 374, at 124.
377. Id. at 137.
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In sum, state officer personal capacity suits are an inadequate
alternative to damage suits against the state itself because, as
currently administered, the qualified immunity doctrine too
often presents an insurmountable bar to meritorious claims.
Some have challenged this conclusion, claiming that personal
capacity suits are "'generally effective" in promoting
compliance with law.3 78 It is fair to ask why the personal
capacity damage suit is an inadequate remedial mechanism for
adjudicating statutory damage claims given the fact that such
suits, with all of the limitations of the qualified immunity
doctrine, have long been the primary mechanism for
adjudicating constitutional damage claims. There are two
answers.
First, the qualified immunity doctrine is equally ill-suited for
the litigation of both constitutional torts and statutory claims.
The function of the qualified immunity doctrine is to reconcile
the need for compensation and deterrence with the need to
discourage unwanted timidity in public officials, to reduce the
risk of deterring able candidates from pursuing careers in
public service, and to eliminate needless distractions from
public duties.379 The weight of academic authority is that the
qualified immunity doctrine is an unsatisfactory vehicle to
accomplish this balancing and should be abandoned, or at least
modified."' It is not an adequate policy-effecting instrument
for either statutory or constitutional claims.
Even if the qualified immunity doctrine was well suited for
the litigation of constitutional torts, its use in personal capacity
statutory damage actions still is ill-advised. The reason is that
378. Vdzquez, supra note 46, at 1800 ("[Flull compensation for undeserved
governmental injuries [cannot be offered] without bankrupting the state. What the
rule of law does require ... is a remedial scheme that is generally effective at
producing systematic compliance with legal norms.").
379. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1997) (discussing the
various reasons for the qualified immunity doctrine); White by White v.
Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that without a meaningful
qualified immunity defense "the course of public agencies would invariably
become one of inaction").
380. See Hassel, supra note 374, at 148-49, nn.116-17 & 120-24. Hassel observes:
A large body of literature critiques the [qualified immunity] defense ....
There are vociferous critics of the qualified immunity doctrine who attack
the doctrine as a whole. This commentary suggests that the problem with
the qualified immunity doctrine is that it is applied to the wrong group of
defendants or that it should be eliminated entirely.
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statutory claims differ fundamentally from constitutional
claims in two respects: (1) the different factual contexts in
which they arise and (2) the different goals they seek to
advance.
Diana Hassel's two-year study shows that courts are most
likely to uphold a qualified immunity defense in cases arising
in the context of a confrontation between law enforcement
officials and the public, a factual context that is a bountiful
source of qualified immunity litigation. s8 In Norwood v. Bain,
38 2
the Fourth Circuit offered a plausible explanation. It explained
that in police confrontation cases there often are "exigencies of
time or circumstance" that make it reasonable for a police
officer to believe that conduct subsequently found to be
unlawful is in fact lawful.31 Similarly, in other situations,
a police officer [may be] confronted with a fast-moving
situation involving immediate threat to himself or
others that require[s] quick action on perhaps a
mistaken perception of the true circumstances. In such
situations, qualified immunity principles may require
finding a resulting violation of right nevertheless
excusable as a reasonable one under the
circumstances.m4
Barbara Armacost also has identified the peculiarities of law
enforcement as an important force conditioning the boundaries
of the qualified immunity doctrine.3  She explains that "it is
necessary to appreciate both the kinds of situations faced by law
enforcement officials and the nature of the legal standards they
are required to apply."386 As to the former, "[l]aw enforcement
requires the exercise of significant discretion, 'often on
inadequate information in situations bordering on
381. See id. at 146 (finding that if the "alleged violation takes place in a
confrontation with law enforcement officials, [the litigation] will rarely result in
the denial of qualified immunity"); see also Melissa L. Koehn, The New American
Caste System: The Supreme Court and Discrimination Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 49, 51 (1998) ("[Sluits against police officers are disfavored
... Plaintiffs who... sue police officers generally confront an amazing thicket of
procedural snarls which often prevent federal courts from hearing the merits of
their claims.").
382. 143 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
383. Id. at 857.
384. Id.
385. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583, 628 (1998).
386. Id.
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emergency."'3 As to the legal environment in which law
enforcement officials operate, "law enforcement officials are
faced with the difficult task of conforming their conduct-in a
virtually infinite variety of factual circumstances-to a set of
imprecise constitutional standards, the parameters of which are
unclear even to trained lawyers."3" In short, law enforcement
officials, due to the conditions of their work and the legal
standards under which they work, are thought to be less
blameworthy when making legal mistakes, and, therefore,
more entitled to the leeway the qualified immunity doctrine
provides.
Yet, it is these pro-defendant rules, so substantially fashioned
to meet the needs of the law enforcement community, that
constitute the corpus of precedent that will be applied
following Alden in state officer damage actions enforcing
federal regulatory statutes. Even if one were to agree that these
rules properly accommodate competing interests in the context
of confrontation between law enforcement officials and the
public, the factual and legal context of federal regulatory
legislation hardly demands such leeway for state officers.
Courts are not likely to develop one qualified immunity
doctrine for constitutional torts and another for statutory
claims. Even now, qualified immunity is a unitary doctrine:
The rules developed for law enforcement contexts are
interchangeably applied in all other constitutional torts
litigation. 9 There is no reason to expect that will change when,
after Alden, the courts begin hearing increased numbers of cases
against state officers alleging violation of federal statutory
rights.
Another important distinction between constitutional tort
litigation as compared to litigation alleging violation of federal
statutory rights is the different objectives these two types of
litigation seek to attain. Barbara Armacost's pioneering work
has argued persuasively that "qualified immunity-like fair
notice in criminal law-employs notice or knowledge of
38Z Id. (quoting John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983,84 VA. L. REV. 47,77 (1998)).
388. Id. at 628.
389. See id. at 634 ("The Supreme Court has held that qualified immunity is a
unitary defense, presumptively intended to apply to the full range of
constitutional claims." (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642-43 (1987))).
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illegality as a proxy for fault.""' She concludes that the
qualified immunity doctrine works to identify state officers
who are blameworthy and does this by isolating those who
acted with "knowledge that the relevant conduct is
forbidden." 91  She argues that this makes sense in
constitutional tort litigation just as fault identification makes
sense in criminal law. In both, the law's aim is "moral
blaming," as she calls this function of fault identification."w
Moral blaming is designed to stigmatize unlawful behavior as a
means of "creating and maintaining societal consensus on what
constitutes appropriate conduct." 3 It "build[s] norms" and
"harness[es] the compliance power of interpersonal
relationships and interpersonal morality."394  In the
constitutional tort context, "constitutional rights are especially
valued in comparison with other kinds of rights, [and] it
follows that constitutional violations would be viewed by
society as especially serious and deserving of opprobrium."
395
In short, both criminal law and the fault-identifying effect of
the qualified immunity doctrine aim to "'signal[] moral
condemnation of the offender, while civil liability does not.'"
396
And that is the point. Civil law does not exist to assign moral
blame to offenders. Ignorance of the rules of contract or tort
law, for example, is no defense. Liability is not limited to
knowing offenders. So also, "[i]n the administrative and
regulatory context... , failure to know the law is generally not
an excuse, at least as far as civil liability is concerned."397 This is
because unlike criminal law and constitutional law,
administrative and regulatory legislation is not designed to
operate through the mechanism of limiting liability to those
390. Id. at 624.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 669.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 674. Limiting liability to knowing violators may be appropriate for
constitutional torts because "important moral and societal interests are vindicated
by a regime that makes blameworthy officials personally liable for their
unconstitutional behavior, even if they do not ultimately pay the judgment
[because of the prevalence of indemnification arrangements]." Id. at 670 (footnote
omitted).
396. Id. at 668 (quoting Paul H. Robinson, Symposium: The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206 (1996)).
397. Id. at 585.
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who are blameworthy. Regulatory legislation seeks to establish
uniform national standards to protect the environment, set
floors of rights for workers, protect copyright holders,
encourage invention through the patent laws, promote
economic growth through the regulation of bankruptcy, and a
myriad of other societal goals having nothing to do with moral
blaming.
Making failure to know the law an excuse, and thereby
limiting liability to those who are knowing law violators,
defeats federal regulatory legislation's goals by
underinclusively compensating and deterring violations.
Moreover, it tears regulatory legislation from its philosophical
and functional moorings by converting it from a vehicle to
advance primarily economic ends into a instrument to assign
blame. For the above reasons, state officer damage suits, with
their qualified immunity limits, are an inadequate alternative
to damage suits against a state to enforce federal statutory
rights. This conclusion follows even if the qualified immunity
regime is appropriate for the litigation of constitutional
violations.
VII. CONCLUSION
By any account, the Trilogy is a stunning development in
federal-state relations. Its genesis is the Court's hostility to
Congress's relatively recent decision to include the states
within a rapidly expanding framework of federal regulatory
statutes. 98 That decision precipitated a backlash. As the Alden
case makes plain, the Court believes that federal regulation of
the states can cause undue interference with the states'
governing ability and fiscal autonomy, especially when it
permits individuals to participate so extensively in the
formation of state policy through the initiation of litigation
398. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2261 (1999) (noting the recent
proliferation of "stautory enactments purporting in express terms to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits"); Rosen, supra note 137, at 43 ("[A]n
explosion of federal lawmaking during the past decade raised questions about
whether Congress deserved deference because of its purported ability to
transcend factionalism, as it federalized great patches of regulatory authority...
that had previously been left to the states."); Sherry, supra note 1 (discussing the
"dramatic expansion in the number of federal laws and the court's hostility
toward Congress's increasing activity."); discussion supra note 205.
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enforcing federal standards.3" When the National League of
Cities strategy of imposing broad substantive restraints on
Congressional power proved unworkable, it was replaced in
Garcia with one relying primarily on the political process,
rather than the judiciary, for modulating Congress.4 0 By the
mid-1990s, a new Court majority concluded Congress could not
be so restrained and thus abandoned reliance on the political
process in favor of renewed judicial activism. The Court
devised a new three-pronged strategy: limit the scope of the
commerce power,401 reinstate National League of Cities to a
limited degree by prohibiting federal commandeering of state
legislative and executive functions 02 and expand the
protections provided by the doctrine of state judicial immunity.
The Seminole Tribe decision most forcefully expresses the
state judicial immunity prong of this new federalism. Its goal is
to insulate the states from individually-initiated damage
actions as a means of safeguarding states' governing and fiscal
autonomy. This goal cannot be achieved merely by stripping
Congress of all Article I-based authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. Congressional
power must be reduced in at least two additional ways. First,
because the Section 5 power contains abrogation authority,
Congress easily could circumvent Seminole Tribe unless its
Section 5 power is checked. The Court dramatically restricted
that power in Boerne, and reinforced those limits in College
Savings Bank I and II. Second, Congress could continue to
invade state governing autonomy and impose fiscal demands if
it were permitted to provide for private damage suits in state
court to enforce federal rights against unconsenting states.
Alden prevented that. The clash in Alden thus was as inevitable
as its outcome was predictable.
The result in Alden also was assured by the unworkability of
the alternative. In this article, I have demonstrated that
exclusive reliance on state courts to enforce private federal
statutory damage claims against the state is not feasible.
Policing such a system would fall to the Supreme Court,
399. See discussion supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text
400. See discussion supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text
401. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,559-67 (1995).
402. See discussion supra note 39.
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adding extraordinarily to the Court's workload and
threatening to draw it into a maelstrom of controversy." 3 Alden
deserves praise for avoiding that quagmire, but it is difficult to
believe the Court would have permitted itself to be so
positioned in any event.
I also have "praised" Alden here as a masterful example of
judicial misdirection. This praise is for the skill witnessed, not
the result achieved. The Trilogy's focus is states' rights but its
holdings significantly empower the executive branch of the
federal government.c 4 It concentrates on remedy but much of
its effect is substantive. °5 Its primary complaint is excess
federal power (that of Congress) but its response is the
empowerment of another federal branch-the Supreme Court
itself.40 6 Not perhaps since the earliest days of the New Deal
has the Court assumed such a pivotal role as active
policymaker with respect to federal-state relations.40 7 The
Court's expanded role as primary federal guardian of the
states' sovereign prerogatives is somewhat ironic. The Court,
the federal branch most removed from the states' political
processes, assumes this role by replacing Congress, the federal
branch that is least removed from the states' political processes.
This transfer of power over the last half-decade from the
Congress to the judicial and executive branches of the federal
government, through cases championing states' rights, truly
has been a tour de force.
This Article also has leveled a strong protest, most of it
directed at Alden. The much-emphasized alternatives to private
damage actions against the states do not adequately protect
federal rights. Neither individually nor in combination do they
compensate for the loss of private damage actions against the
states. Either they are "whimsical," 48 they are underinclusive
403. See discussion supra notes 176-202 and accompanying text.
404. See supra text accompanying note 207.
405. See discussion supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
406. See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (observing that at the same time "Congress
and the executive branch have appeared nearly paralyzed by partisan stalemate
and by their own internal weaknesses," the Alden Trilogy resulted in a palpable
flow of "governmental power in Washington . . . in the court's direction");
discussion supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
407. See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (The majority opinion in College Savings Bank
I "assumed for the court a veto power beyond any it has exercised in modern
times.").
408. See discussion supra notes 220-34, 250-58 and accompanying text.
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and plagued by a maze of contradictions and exceptions, 4°9
they fail to compensate or deter,"' ° they have been undermined
by recent developments, 41' or they fail to provide relief most of
the time when used to enforce statutory rights, even when
claims are meritorious.412 These alternatives, in combination
with the regime of Seminole Tribe, Boerne, and the Alden Trilogy,
too often render federal statutory rights illusory. It simply is
not credible for the Court to represent them as efficacious
alternatives, and by doing so the Court risks creating the
impression of being both partisan and disingenuous.
Legislative responses are available to fill some of the
enforcement gap these recent federalism cases create.
Government enforcement could be augmented with additional
resources. Creative use of the spending power could coax more
"voluntary" waiver of sovereign immunity from the states.
Congress could amend federal regulatory statutes to make a
clear statement of intent to provide a Young remedy and a
private right of action against state officers. Congress could
legislate revised qualified immunity standards that more
neutrally accommodate the needs for deterrence and
compensation with the competing instrumental needs of
government to protect state officers from frivolous suits. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the legal and
political issues such legislative responses would generate, but
clearly there is considerable room for a legislative response.
Finally, one wonders what to make of Justice Souter's soon-
to-be-famous prophecy in his Alden dissent, that equates the
constitutionalizing of sovereign immunity doctrine with the
Lochner era's constitutionalizing of economic self-reliance and
predicts a short life for the Court's new sovereign immunity
experiment.413
409. See discussion supra notes 235-49 and accompanying text.
410. See discussion supra notes 269-302 and accompanying text.
411. See discussion supra notes 269-302 and accompanying text.
412 See discussion supra notes 303-91and accompanying text.
413. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2294-95 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
The full quote is:
The resemblance of today's state sovereign immunity to the Lochner era's
industrial due process is striking. The Court began this century by
imputing constitutional status to a conception of economic self-reliance
that was never true to industrial life and grew insistently fictional with
the years, and the Court has chosen to close the century by conferring like
status on a conception of state sovereign immunity that is true neither to
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My sense is such a prediction is premature.4  Vicki Jackson's
observation deserves repeating: "Federalism is quintessentially
a political deal among different governments. Workability is its
core .... To be successful, federalism must be pragmatic and it
must be dynamic."415 To some degree, the Alden Trilogy is a
pragmatic masterpiece, as I have argued. Even those who
support the Trilogy agree, however, that it might thwart the
ability to govern effectively in an age of global
communications, trade, and multiculturalism. 4 16 Indeed, many
view the Trilogy as an opportunity for the states to disregard
federal law." 7 If this experiment in sovereign immunity in fact
renders federal statutory rights illusory, it never will take
history nor to the structure of the Constitution. I expect the Court's late
essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier
experiment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as
indefensible, and probably as fleeting.
Id.
414. One can obtain opinions in both directions. Compare Greenhouse, supra
note 10 (The Alden Trilogy is "the most powerful indication yet of a narrow
majority's determination to reconfigure the balance between state and federal
authority in favor of the states."), and Greenhouse, supra note I Justice Rehnquist
"appears on the verge of succeeding [in curtailing the national government's
authority over the states] to a degree that would have seemed implausible only a
few years ago."), with Warren Richey, Rehnquist's Legacy Takes Shape, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONrrOR, June 28, 1999, at I ("'[ihe jurisprudence remains highly unstable
.... It is really much too early to know whether these precedents will stand up
over time." (quoting Professor Burt Neuborne, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law)).
415. Jackson, supra note 116, at 2228.
416. See, e.g., David Ignatius, Back to the States, WASH. POST, June 27,1999, at B7.
David Ignatius worries:
There's a danger, certainly, that the court's growing enthusiasm for state
government could begin to erode the federal government's ability to
respond to genuine national issues-such as the environment, or racial
and sexual discrimination .... [S]ome sound national policies-such as
workplace laws or privacy laws-may now be enforceable against
everyone but the states, which is a perverse result.
Id.; see also Sherry, supra note 1 (Ihe recent federalism cases "jeopardize[] many
federal statutes that purport to govern the states in their capacity as employers, as
market participants and as service providers.").
417. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16. Chemerinsky argues:
The Supreme Court based its rulings on its desire to protect federalism
and state sovereignty. Yet, in doing so, the court subverted the most basic
constitutional principle of federalism: the supremacy of federal law....
The effect of the] decision is that state governments now can ignore
federal law, and no court will be available to enforce it.
Id.; see also Editorial, WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at A18 ("But the blow the court
struck raises real worries about the states being freer to violate long presumed
rights of individuals. It tends to deprive individuals of the power to do anything
about state violations of important federal laws.").
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root.418 On the other hand, if it is true that "[t]he flowering of
competence and creativity at the state government level is one
of the underappreciated developments of the past few
decades," then the Trilogy might be just right for "the new
regionalism" that some see as the "corollary of
globalization."4 9 Whatever may be the Trilogy's longevity, it
will endure as a hallmark of the Rehnquist Court whose
prominent place in American legal history it helps secure.
418. Deeply embedded in our constitutional tradition is the value that a
properly constituted government's legislative and judicial power ought to be co-
extensive. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818
(1824) ("[Tlhe legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-
constructed government, are co-extensive with each other."). Securing rights
through meaningful remedies is thought to be a cultural imperative of the highest
order. See ECONOMIST, supra note 14, at 11 ("The [Trilogy's] rulings also seem to
breach a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American law: no right without a remedy.");
Lewis, supra note 16 (criticizing the Trilogy for permitting the "states [to] break
[the] law without fear of being sued").
419. Ignatius, supra note 411 (Globalization implies this new regionalism
because "just as the world is becoming more centralized in economic matters, it's
becoming more diverse and decentralized in cultural and political affairs ... the
nation state is too big for the small problems of life and too small for the big
problems." (citing sociologist Daniel Bell)).
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